Profit-sharing versus fixed-payment contracts: Evidence from the motion pictures industry
DC Chisholm - The Journal of Law, Economics, and …, 1997 - academic.oup.com
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1997•academic.oup.com
The choice between sharing and fixed-payment compensation schemes is examined using
data on contracts from the motion pictures industry. Several competing explanations are
explored, including moral hazard mitigation, risk sharing, liquidity constraints, and the
superstar phenomenon. Detailed descriptive statistics are presented, and qualitative
variation in contracting clauses is analyzed within this industry's institutional setting.
data on contracts from the motion pictures industry. Several competing explanations are
explored, including moral hazard mitigation, risk sharing, liquidity constraints, and the
superstar phenomenon. Detailed descriptive statistics are presented, and qualitative
variation in contracting clauses is analyzed within this industry's institutional setting.
Abstract
The choice between sharing and fixed-payment compensation schemes is examined using data on contracts from the motion pictures industry. Several competing explanations are explored, including moral hazard mitigation, risk sharing, liquidity constraints, and the superstar phenomenon. Detailed descriptive statistics are presented, and qualitative variation in contracting clauses is analyzed within this industry's institutional setting.
Oxford University Press