34 () POLITICAL THEORY/AUGUST 1987 original situation. There is, in effect, an implied asymmetry between the most and the least privileged. The second group is favored over the first. If people nevertheless preferit, it is because they tend to adopt the point of view of the least advantaged implicitly and without compelling reason." The universalism that was aimed at does not obtain because the second principle rests on the particular point of view instead of the universal point of view of the rational individual. The second principle would, however, not be undermined by such a criticism if Rawls were able to recognize that adopting the point ofview of the least advantaged, while not absolutely rational, is nonetheless partially justifiable. But he cannot acknowledge such a possibility because his aim is to deduce a strictly universal conception of justice. Faced with these failures and inconsistencies, one may be tempted to dismiss the very premise of a project that attempts to define a conception ofjustice that will produce, at least in principle, a unanimous agreement among rational beings. The theses of radical liberalism, like those of Rawls, are in fact efforts to carry out a program, based on unanimous agreement. Rawls's work expresses this aim with particular clarity, but it is no different in the case of the radical liberals. Rawls states explicitly that he wishes to give his theory a certain and unshakable base. It must rest on an “Archimediean point," that is to say, on a unanimously agreed-upon position, considered necessary by all.“The original position is so characterized that unanimity is possible.” To justify his choice of unanimity, he adds:“For the most part the philosophical tradition including intuitionism, has assumed that there exists some appropriate perspective from which unanimity on moral questions may be hoped for, at least among rational persons with relevantly similar and sufficient information.” 9

The project of basing political legitimacy on unanimity cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that it appears at first glance unrealistic, for it also seems to derive inescapably from the fundamental principles of modern individualism. By nature, every individual is free and equal to every other individual. There is no essential difference or natural hierarchy among individuals to justify the domination of some over others. Political power and the rules it promulgates can have no other legitimate basis than the will of these equal individuals. This power and these rules bear on all members of society and constrain them all. The rules can, therefore, be legitimate only as long as they arise from the will of all and represent the will of all. In order to be realistic and to relax the exorbitant demands of unanimity, one may add that this unanimity is