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Seeing without Recognizing? More on Denuding Perceptual Content

From: Philosophy East and West
Volume 54, Number 3, July 2004
pp. 365-367 | 10.1353/pew.2004.0015

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2004 by University of Hawai‘i Press lasts or what can be called the instrumental cause of a perception with full-fledged qualificative content. The latter controversy is muddied with the turbid understanding one has of what Kant meant by concepts or the use of concepts in the shaping of an experience. Now, I have for a long time felt that not just Kant’s but just about every Western philosopher’s concept of a concept (except Frege’s, which is an odd notion) is regrettably unclear. Notwithstanding his book A Study of Concepts (MIT Press, 1992), even Peacocke’s notion of a concept (which is different from Fodor’s notion of a concept) does not yield obvious answers to such simple queries as: ‘‘Can two people possess the same concept?’’ or ‘‘When I use a concept that I possess to process a perceived content, do I make the concept itself an object of...



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