Kant and "The Dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley"

Kant and "The DogmaticIdealism of Berkeley" MARGARET D. WILSON IN TIlE "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON" Kant maintains that space and time are (merely) a priori conditions of our perceptual experience--mere "forms" under which our sensible objects must appear. Thus space and time have no claim to reality independent of us, of our experience: they are "transcendentally ideal." Similarly, the objects we perceive in space and time are also said to be transcendentally ideal: since their character is determined by the spatial and temporal conditions of our experience, they have an intrinsic dependence on us. Kant contrasts these mind-dependent or conditional perceptual objects ("appearance") with the realm of the unconditioned, transcendentally real "thing in itself." Our knowledge is limited to sensible objects, to appearance. 1 One of Kant's most insistent claims is that his "transcendental" idealism differs radically from all previous idealisms, and indeed vindicates "empirical realism" against them. Whereas earlier idealisms deny or call into question the reality of the physical world, Kant contends that transcendental idealism provides a uniquely secure basis for the claim that we do have knowledge of real things in space. He holds that knowledge of spatial reality is possible if and only if space is regarded as a condition of our perception, and things in space are distinguished from things in themselves. Specifically, Kant represents himself as a defender of realism against two idealist positions. One is "problematic idealism"--defined as the doctrine that we can have no immediate knowledge of objects in space; that such objects can at best be inferred as causes of the immediately perceived ideas in our own mind. Kant claims that such inference can never lead to certainty; hence on this view the existence of outer objects would always remain problematic or doubtful. Not too surprisingly, Kant associates problematic idealism with Descartes and his i Kant characterizes his position as "transcendental idealism" at A 369 ft. Cf. A 28=B 44; A 36=B 52. The quotations in this paper are from Norman Kemp Smith's translation (London : Macmillan, 1958). [4591 460 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY followers.2 He discusses this position in the first edition of the Critique ("Paralogisms " section),3 in the Prolegomena,4 and in a new section inserted in the second edition of the Critique, titled "Refutation of Idealism." s (As we shall have occasion to note below, there is a clear change in Kant's manner of replying to problematic idealism in the course of these three works.) The other idealist position to which Kant explicitly contrasts his own is called "dogmatic idealism." The dogmatic idealist is said to hold that there can be no real things in space, that space (and everything in it) is "false and impossible," or that spatial appearances are mere "illusion." Dogmatic idealism is mentioned only briefly in the first edition (in the course of the reply to Descartes); 6 it is not attributed to any particular philosopher. In the Prolegomena and second edition, however, Kant repeatedly associates this doctrine with the name of Berkeley. 7 And he seeks to emphasize the merits of his own position, and especially his conception of space, as an answer to the "dogmatic idealist." As Kant openly indicates, the new polemical interest in Berkeley resulted from the critical reception of the first edition: more than one reader, to Kant's displeasure, thought there were significant affinities between transcendental idealism and Berkeley's philosophy, a Kant's conception of problematic idealism is quite perspicuous. Further, while there are points of obscurity in all of Kant's anti-Cartesian passages the general line of attack is sufficiently clear in each case. His treatment of dogmatic or 2 The attribution of problematic idealism to Descartes does involve some license, of course, since Descartes himself concluded that the transcendental causal inference can be guaranteed. But Kant, like many post-Cartesian philosophers, evidently felt that the most significant of Descartes' arguments were those developed in the first two Meditations. A 366 ft. 4 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, w49. The Prolegomena (1783) was published between the first (1781) and second (1787) editions of the Critique. 5 B 274 ft. Cf. Kant's note on this passage in...