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William Ockham and Trope Nominalism

From: Franciscan Studies
Volume 55, 1998
pp. 105-120 | 10.1353/frc.1998.0027

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Footnotes

1.

I would like to thank Ruth Garrett Millikan, A. S. McGrade, and Andrew Beedle for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.

2. D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978).

3. D. M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1989).

4. Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987) 73.

5. See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III, Chpt. VI, xxxvi.

6. D.M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism, 27.

7. Op.cit.

8. D. M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, 114.

9. Ibid, 88-89.

10. Ibid, 118.

11. See Ibid, 126.

12. Op. cit.

13. William Ockahm, Ordinatio d.2, q.6, Paul V. Spade transl., draft, 1986. [All references to Ockaham's Latin works are to the editions of Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera Thoelogica [OTh} and Opera Philosophica at Theologica [OPTh}, G. Gal, O.F.M. et al. eds. (St. Bonaventure NY: Franciscan Institute, 1966-1988) OTh I, 196.13-21 "...omnis res extra animam est realiter singularis et una numero, quia omnis res extra animam vel est simplex vel composite....Si sit composite, tandem oportet devinere ad certum numerum partium, et per consequens quaeliber illarum partium erit una numero...."

14. Summa Logicae I, Chpt. 24, in Ockham's Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae, Michael J. Loux, transl. (Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1974) 101; OPTh I, 79.40, "Non solum autem tenendum est quod proprium non semper est inhaerens subiecto cuius dicitur proprium..."

15. Ibid, 102; OPTh I, 80.78-81.80 "Non tamen oportet quod semper illud extrinsecum sit aligau res extra animam, exsistens realiter in rerum natura, sed forte aliquando sufficit quod sit aliquid possibile in rerum natura, vel forte digno propositio exsistens vel potens in mente exsistere."

16. Quodlibet IV, q. 27 in William of Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, Vol. 1, Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis E. Kelley (Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy: Yale Univ. Press, 1991) 360. Oth IX, 436.65-68 "...dico quod substantia, qualitas, quantitas sunt distincta praedicamenta, quamvis non significent rem absolutam distinctam a substantia, et qualitate, quia sunt distincti conceptus et voces easdem res diversimode significantes."

17. Ordinatio I, dist. 30, q. 1, in Arthur Hyman & James Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 2d ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Press, 1986) 680. Oth IV, 287.17 "...sed impossibile est aliquam rem, quae sit relatio, intelligi sime omni alia re...."

18. Ibid, 682; OTh IV, 310.6-8 "Unde qui poset intelligere Sortem et Platonem et albedines eorum, nihil aliud intelligendo, statim diceret Sortem esse similem Platoni."

19. Ibid, 684; OTh IV, 316.10-16 "Sed sic est imaginandum quod intellectus nihil plus facit ad hoc quod Sortes sit similis quam ad hoc quod Sortes sit albus. Immo ex hoc ipso quod Sortes est albus et Plato est albus, Sortes est similis Platoni, omni alio imaginabili circumscripto. [Et ita Sortes est similis Platoni propter sola absoluta, omni alio velinre vel in intellectu circumscripto.] Et ita in re nihil est praeter absoluta." (Bracketed sentence not included in Walsh translation.)

20. See Summa Logicae I, Chpt.44.

21. Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham, 276.

22. Summa Logicae I, cap. 16, Loux, 83. OPTh I, 54.11-14 "...in creaturis nunquam potest esse aliqua distinctio qualiscumque extra animam nisi ubi res distinctae sunt; si igitur inter istam naturam et istam differentiam sit qualiscumque distinctio, oportet quod sint res realiter distinctae."

23. Ibid, 84, OPTh I, 57.79-83 "...sed quiquid imaginible substantiale exsistens in Sorte vel est materia particularis vel forma particularis vel compositum ex his. Et ideo omnis essentia et quidditas et quidquid est substantiae, si sit realiter extra animam, vel est simplicter et absolute materia vel forma vel compositum ex his..."

24. Reportatio II, q. 13, Hyman and Walsh, 677 [incorrectly listed as q. 15] OTh V, 284.1-4 "...dico quod intellectus primo intelligit singulare intuitive. Tum quia intellectus intelligit illud quod est in re intuitive; sed nihil est tale nisi singulare."

25. Op.cit. Oth V, 293.2-4 "Unde sicut non omnis notitia incomlexa est...



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