A basic debate in world politics involves the impact of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) on international conflict. Liberals, functionalists, and others see IGOs as capable of transforming global anarchy, while realists emphasize the essential irrelevance of IGOs in managing such fundamental processes as war and peace. Recent quantitative studies also yield disparate conclusions depending on particular econometric assumptions, implying variously that IGOs foster pacific relations among states, have no impact on dispute behavior, or even increase dispute propensity. At least part of the problem is a lack of theoretical and empirical specificity. The authors apply bargaining theory to develop a "middle path" between the realist and liberal perspectives. Only some IGOs, those with security mandates and the most sophisticated institutional structures, are likely to influence dispute behavior. The authors combine the theory with two improvements in research design. First, IGOs vary in capability, mandate, and cohesion. The authors construct a dataset of IGO institutional heterogeneity and member cohesiveness. Second, states join IGOs for reasons that are not unrelated to why states fight. The authors control for the level of international involvement among countries and find support for their arguments in initial tests.
Denmark and Britain have adopted quite similar "active" social reforms in which employers play a major role in the programmatic delivery of services; however, the implementation of the programs has differed dramatically in the two countries. Danish firms, despite having had virtually no prior involvement in administering social programs, have participated in far greater numbers than British employers, who, by contrast, have long provided private, employment-based social benefits.
Drawing from interviews with 107 randomly selected British and Danish corporations, this article seeks to explain why Danish employers have participated at higher rates than their British counterparts. Subtle programmatic differences that reflect each country's welfare regime have had profound feedback effects on firms' willingness to participate in the programs; these findings have implications for regimes' capacities both to correct for traps and to revise social protections to meet the needs of the new economy.
Federal government -- Germany -- History -- 19th century.
Federal government -- Italy -- History -- 19th century.
This article examines the paradox of how federal political institutions are created:
how can a state-building core be unyielding enough to forge a union but accommodating enough to grant federal concessions to subunits?
A comparison of the trajectories of national unification in nineteenth-century Germany and Italy indicates that the formation of federations does not come about exclusively through voluntary "contract"; instead, coercion and cooperation go hand in hand in the formation of all states, including federations. Whether the outcome is federal or unitary depends on the level of subunit infrastructural capacity at the moment of founding.
The article finds that where the constituents of a potential federation are parliamentary and well governed, they can deliver the benefits of state formation, assuring their continued existence in a federation. Where such subunits are patrimonial and poorly governed, they are absorbed within a unitary model of governance. This institutional explanation supplements accounts emphasizing
the cultural sources of federalism and revises arguments that only militarily weak founding cores make federal concessions to their constituents.
OECD economies were able to reconcile the pursuit of welfare state expansion and full employment during the first decades of the postwar period. Yet the trade-off between these two policy objectives widened in recent decades. To explore the question of why this change occurred, this article extends familiar models of wage determination by adding a number of parameters that capture cross-national differences among welfare states. The model identifies the conditions under which unions deliver wage moderation in exchange for social policy benefits and transfers and explores how different labor-market institutions magnify or decrease the impact of wage choices on the equilibrium level of employment. Next, the author examines the impact of changes in the composition of social policy expenditures and in the level of the tax burden on unions' wage choices. She shows that mature welfare states, characterized by high tax burdens and a high share of transfers devoted to labor-market outsiders, reduce the effectiveness of wage moderation in lowering unemployment. The author tests the main propositions using OECD panel data for the period 1960-95.
Ferguson, Niall. Colossus: the price of America's empire.
Johnson, Chalmers A. Sorrows of empire: militarism, secrecy and the end of the Republic.
Mann, Michael, 1942- Incoherent empire.
United States -- Foreign relations -- 2001-
Militarism -- United States.
This article reviews three recent books critical of America's new "imperial" foreign policy, examines whether the United States can properly be compared to empires of the past, and identifies three aspects of contemporary American policy that may well be called imperialist.It also addresses some of the main objections to recent U.S. foreign policy made by American realist scholars and argues that traditional interstate realism can no longer readily apply to the problem of American unipolar preponderance over an anarchical, nuclear-armed world.