And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864 (review)

The 1864 Virginia Campaign is a familiar subject to students of the American Civil War, having been examined at length in such works as Clifford Dowdey's Lee's Last Campaign, and Noah Andre Trudeau's Bloody Roads South. Indeed the topic has been covered so well that one might be tempted to ask why another history of the campaign is either necessary or desirable. And yet Mark Grimsley's study is such a well-written, fast-paced account, and contains enough new insights, that it merits closer scrutiny.

Among the more interesting aspects of the book is the way in which Grimsley critically assesses both the military leadership of North and South as well as overall strategic planning. Grimsley is quick to place the blame for the failure of Grant's strategic vision on subordinate commanders, such as Franz Sigel and Ben Butler. He does not deny, however, that Grant must also shoulder at least part of the blame for placing too much faith in these subordinates. The plain fact was, as Grimsley points out, that Grant did not know the men he commanded, as he had his smaller force in the West.

Furthermore, Grant routinely underestimated both Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. Grant failed to realize that at least part of the reason for his success in the western theater was the fact that the Confederacy made the defense of Richmond its top priority, and hence directed the bulk of its military resources, its ablest commanders, and best troops, into the defense of its capital.

Grimsley illustrates other shortcomings of Grant as well, such as his habit of constantly looking over the shoulder of Army of the Potomac Commander George Meade, and even bypassing Meade to issue orders directly to subordinates when it suited his purposes. Grimsley takes a much more favorable view of Meade than most historians who often characterize him as either an impediment to Grant's strategic vision or as a cipher through whom Grant transmitted orders to the army. Grimsley makes plain that George Meade was no mere errand boy but had a mind of his own. He had suffered several setbacks when the Army of the Potomac took an aggressive stance, and, therefore, had good reason to urge caution.

Although Grimsley is critical of Grant, he also points out that he learned from his mistakes, adopted new tactics, and most importantly, did not give up, unlike several of his predecessors, most notably "Fighting Joe" Hooker, who either complained about their bad luck or, worse, retreated when things went wrong. Grimsley is also harshly critical of Phil Sheridan and what he calls Sheridan's "casual attitude" towards Meade's orders. In Grimsley's view, Sheridan's failure, as cavalry commander, to provide useful and timely reconnaissance regarding Confederate movements, and to screen his own army's movements, may have cost the Union a victory at the Wilderness.

Nor do Southern commanders escape criticism. Grimsley makes numerous references to the aggressive tendencies of the Army of Northern Virginia and especially of its commander, Robert E. Lee. In fact both Lee and Grant were consistently guilty of misreading the situation and of mistakenly believing that the enemy was "on the verge of collapse," which led them both to order costly assaults that took thousands of lives and brought little result. Of particular note is Grimsley's harsh criticism of both Grant and Lee at Cold Harbor, following the calamitous assault of June 3, 1864, for the petulant way in which they dragged out for four days truce negotiations to bury the dead and gather the wounded, allowing thousands of wounded men on both sides to bleed to death. As Grimsley puts it: "It was a sorry episode in both men's careers" (220).

Grimsley does not concern himself solely with the "brass hats." He also gives a good account of what life was like for the common soldier on both sides: living conditions...