Somalia and Sudan's Race to the Fore in Africa

U.S. calculations regarding Africa shifted dramatically following September 11 and the onset of the war in Afghanistan. In late 2001, as the U.S.-led coalition vanquished Taliban and Al Qaeda bases of power, senior U.S. officials reiterated almost daily that Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen were now a priority focus in the emergent next phase of the U.S. war on global terrorism. Overheated international print and electronic media maintained the high volume surrounding the story. By the end of 2001, Washington had openly designated the Horn of Africa as a new priority in achieving global security and proceeded urgently to investigate Sudanese and Somali past allegiances to Osama bin Laden, as well as the potential for those two countries to serve as havens for Al Qaeda members fleeing Afghanistan. Steadily, counterterrorism edged to the fore in U.S. policy toward Africa, and the Horn became the de facto center of gravity. Key policy elements include containment in Somalia; counterterrorism and promotion of peace and stability in Sudan (both of these elements building on prior inherited initiatives); and ambiguous, budding security partnerships with Kenya and Ethiopia. For both Sudan and Somalia, long-term U.S. intentions remain uncertain.

In parts of Africa other than the Horn, just as the need for intelligence resources was escalating, those resources were diverted. High-level engagement declined in priority concerns such as Zimbabwe's swiftly worsening crisis, Nigeria's shambolic and violent transition, South Africa's toughened internal atmosphere, and Liberian president Charles Taylor's persistent mischief in West Africa. Interestingly, high-level activism accelerated on trade with Africa and, following a lag of several months, began to pick up again for HIV/AIDS in early 2002.

The shift in focus to the Horn could, of course, prove transitory. For instance, should Al Qaeda elements not surface in Sudan or Somalia, should each state be able to assuage external suspicions of lingering ties to Al Qaeda, and should Washington's counterterrorism focus shift to the Philippines, Indonesia, or elsewhere, U.S. interest in the Horn might dissipate just as rapidly as it grew. More realistically, the United States will not be able to eliminate the threat to its security interests posed by Sudan and Somalia expeditiously or reliably in the near future. Both countries are highly porous, fractured, and weak (or wrecked) states; both welcomed Al Qaeda in the past and retain linkages to it today. Within each country, sympathies for militant Islam persist in security institutions as well as among warlords, mullahs and imams, and ordinary citizens. Even if the United States or some other major, external entity was determined to drive a process of political reconstitution (a forbidding mandate which, up to now, the United States has avoided), seemingly intractable internal conflicts, which cannot be overcome quickly, have also riven each country. For the duration of President George W. Bush's administration, Sudan and Somalia will remain credible potential havens for Al Qaeda and like-minded groups even if, at a popular level in both Sudan and Somalia, militant Islam has been widely discredited and its organizational structures have dissipated.

These new realities have slowly begun to register in Washington, D.C., and Africa alike. The Horn of Africa's elevated importance to U.S. security interests predominates U.S. Africa policy, and all signs indicate that this situation will remain constant for the next several years. States in the Horn are scrambling to stay out of harm's way while maximizing their advantage in separate dealings with Washington. Outside the Horn, the enthusiasm of reformist African leaders for Washington's antiterrorist campaign is cooling, while cunning renegades, such as Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe and Liberia's Taylor, exult in the new leeway they enjoy because of the diversion from them of serious international attention. In Washington, the Bush administration's intensified engagement with Sudan has in turn intensified concern among the...