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The Washington Quarterly 24.3 (2001) 105-112



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Participate in the African Renaissance

Francis Kornegay, Chris Landsberg, and Steve McDonald


The United States reflects a triple heritage that has shaped societies throughout the Western Hemisphere. This heritage includes Native American, European, and African elements. These civilizations, however, have by no means equally shaped the foreign policy outlook of the United States and its relationships with the rest of the world. People of African origin in particular feel excluded from the U.S. foreign policy architecture. From an African perspective, therefore, an "ideal" United States would be one that considered its African heritage on par with its European legacy. Such a tradition would suggest that Africa should be defined as important enough to be regarded as "vital" to U.S. national interests. From this designation would flow a U.S. commitment to become a full-fledged partner in the African Renaissance, which is an ambitious bid for continental renewal reflected in a series of political and economic initiatives involving such major powers as South Africa, Nigeria, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and other African partners.

Such a shift in policy focus would reflect the U.S. foreign affairs establishment's assimilation of the reality of a socially diverse and multicultural electoral constituency. Based on U.S. 2000 census data, the white male electorate represents a demographically declining constituency in U.S. politics. Globally, a demographic shift is also underway toward an increasingly Afro-Asian world.

This demographic reality is one factor that has shaped an increasingly bipartisan approach to Africa over the last 15 years. The end of the Cold War [End Page 105] and the effect of globalization on the U.S. economy and trade policy are others. In the past, U.S. Africa policy was the bailiwick of liberal Democrats and African American leadership. This situation no longer exists. Coalitions across party lines, including moderate Republicans, established U.S. sanctions against South Africa in the mid-1980s and, more recently, passed the African Growth and Opportunity Act. The photo finish to the U.S. 2000 elections, the even party distribution in Congress, and the perception that Africa is not of vital national interest makes a reasoned, nondivisive examination of U.S. policy feasible.

The point of departure for relations between the United States and Africa in the coming years should be based on initiatives that Africa's leadership is undertaking to control the continent's destiny, as embodied in the Millennium African Recovery/Renaissance Plan (MAP) spearheaded by South African president Thabo Mbeki, Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, and Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika. MAP's aim is to build foundations for stability by emphasizing conflict resolution; then to coordinate assistance to fragile African economies, employing a combination of debt relief, investment promotion, trade concessions, and foreign assistance with built-in African conditions by which Africa's leaders must abide. To support this millennium plan, what could the United States do to add more substance to the greater attention that it has recently paid to Africa?

Pivot on Fora

One of the mistakes that Washington's policy apparatus made previously was depending on a network of pivotal African states that proved untenable for U.S. political involvement, especially in Angola in the west, in the Congo in the heart of the continent, in Sudan with its "invisible war," and in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The United States must not rely solely on "pivotal states" and regional influences. Rather, it may want to concentrate on linking its key bilateral relationships involving some leading countries such as South Africa and Nigeria with its relationships with the continent's subregional groupings, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in northeast Africa.

The model for such a strategy would be the recent combination of the U.S.-South African Bi-National Commission (BNC) with a regional U.S.-SADC Forum. The United States could expand such a forum beyond purely economic and trade issues to include...

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