Moscow's Matrix

On April 14, 2000, in a surprising move after almost five years of inaction, the Russian Duma ratified the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). According to this agreement, Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces are to be reduced to 3,500 deployed strategic warheads each--almost half of the ceilings imposed by the START I Treaty. The ratification, however, is widely perceived as Moscow's attempt to intentionally complicate possible U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The START II Treaty was ratified with amendments that make its implementation very difficult--if not impossible--if the existing U.S.-Russian dispute over NMD deployments and the future of the ABM Treaty is not resolved. Moreover, along with the START II ratification bill, the Duma approved a nonbinding resolution asking the Russian president to continue pressing for U.S. compliance to the ABM Treaty in exchange for the START II instruments of ratification.

Russia's Security Calculations

Russia's opposition to NMD and its subsequent action on these treaties is based on its difficult security dilemmas. There are concerns that "limited" U.S. NMD plans include deployments that could lead to a radical expansion of the system, including the capability to intercept a significant number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In particular, Washington's plan includes orbiting space-based ABM sensors, which could considerably improve targeting and tracking capabilities of the potential NMD. Once effective surveillance, acquisition, targeting, and kill assessment systems are established, it would be much simpler for the United States to produce and deploy interceptors needed to cope with a large-scale missile attack. Thus, even if the number of deployed interceptors were limited by a modified ABM Treaty, it would provide Washington with significant breakout capability if it decides to abandon the treaty. In other words, deployed capability could be increased quite rapidly.

Current Russian strategic nuclear forces are powerful enough to penetrate a limited U.S. NMD. For economic reasons, however, their size will significantly decline in the future, perhaps to less than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads. Furthermore, the eastward enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S. dominance in submarine warfare make Russian nuclear forces increasingly vulnerable to a first strike. As a result, a classic situation of instability would emerge: the Kremlin would fear that its modest nuclear forces could be considerably reduced by a first strike, and the retaliatory strike--made by the few surviving weapons--could be successfully intercepted even by a limited and relatively ineffective U.S. NMD. "Use it or lose it" incentives could threaten strategic stability.

U.S. NMD deployment together with increased capabilities to destroy Russian missiles could be sufficient to undermine Russian strategic nuclear deterrence. This would require Moscow to introduce certain countermeasures aimed at penetrating U.S. NMD. Those measures could include

• increasing overall ceilings for deployed strategic forces;

• maintaining them on a hair-trigger alert;

• re-MIRVing existing missiles and deploying decoys on them; ¹

• deploying maneuverable warheads able to escape collision with interceptors;

• resuming antisatellite programs aimed at neutralizing space-based NMD components;

• resuming routine patrol of submarines in open seas in order to circumvent the NMD system oriented to the north; and

• relying more on cruise missiles and aircraft, against which ABM defenses are only marginally successful.

On numerous occasions, the Russian military has indicated that it is developing countermeasures specifically targeting U.S. NMD. In June 1999, the Topol-M ICBM was successfully tested with a warhead capable of making "side maneuvers," aimed at avoiding collision with antimissile interceptors. Furthermore, in the autumn of 1999, authoritative military sources hinted that deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) might be considered a potential countermeasure against NMD. In November 1999 it was announced that production of SS-N-23 SLBMs would resume.

All of these measures will force Russia to increase spending on its strategic force modernization and could cause additional complications for the domestic...