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Reviewed by:
  • Max Weber’s ‘Objectivity’ Reconsidered
  • John Veugelers (bio)
Laurence H. McFalls. Max Weber’s ‘Objectivity’ Reconsidered. University of Toronto Press. viii, 390. $75.00

‘All the analysis of infinite reality which the finite human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the object of scientific investigation, and that only it is “important” in the sense of being “worthy of being known.” But what are the criteria by which this segment is selected?’ These words come from ‘The “Objectivity” of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy’ by the great sociologist Max Weber. Like his better-known The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, this essay was published in 1904, when Weber became the co-editor of the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik. His practical task was to lay out the [End Page 327] standards by which the journal’s editors would judge submissions. In doing so he entered the Methodenstreit, the debate among German historians and political economists over the goals and methods of the human sciences. The advocates of a scientistic and law-seeking approach (the followers of the Manchester school) argued against those for whom the uniqueness of historical individuals and events meant that knowledge could only be particular (and certainly not valid ‘across cases’). Weber disagreed with both sides. To stake out an alternative, his essay promotes the concept of the ideal type, analyzes the relationship between knower and known, defines the realm in which values belong in social science, and elaborates upon the kind of knowledge toward which social science might legitimately aspire.

In my opinion, Weber took an overly restrictive view of the possibility of arriving at non-trivial generalizations that hold under specific social and historical conditions. With its mix of discernment, depth, and passion, his essay remains riveting nonetheless, and even today we can gain much from reading it.

The hundredth anniversary of the essay’s publication provided the occasion for the conference that gave birth to this edited volume. Questions its fourteen chapters address include: What does objectivity mean for Weber? How do his ideas relate to those of others (Durkheim, Mannheim, Gramsci, Parsons, Wittgenstein, Winch, Kuhn)? In his substantive research, did Weber follow his own prescriptions on method? What are the advantages or disadvantages of applying a Weberian approach to the study of European as well as non-European societies? In general the answers this volume gives to the first two questions are insightful.

The opening chapter by John Drysdale argues convincingly that Weber’s essay says more about what objectivity is not than what it is. Yet Weber does cast doubt on the assumption that the knower (subject) can know anything without also holding presuppositions about the known (object). Further, we can learn what Weber means by objectivity (as well as ideal types, historical individuals, and cultural significance) when he puts these concepts to work in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

John B. Gunnell’s chapter draws on Kuhn to show that Weber’s argument that social science can provide valid knowledge rests on the implicit notion that the categories used by social scientists and those they study are different. Oddly, Gunnell does not really develop the Kuhnian insight that Weber’s portrait of how science works (in the selection of problems, methods, evidence, and rules of proof) is fixed on the practices of the individual researcher and thus quite unsociological.

Just as strange in Weber’s essay is the neglect of power. Typically his sociology gives much attention to social conflict. In the essay on [End Page 328] objectivity, however, Weber argues that knowledge arrived at impartially can help policy makers to make responsible decisions. Drawing on Mannheim and Gramsci, Peter Breiner’s chapter points out practical limits to the implementation of ‘impartial knowledge’: the barriers put up by incommensurate ideologies and antagonistic political forces.

Among other outstanding chapters, that by Catherine Colliot-Thélène provides an adept comparison of Weber and Durkheim (though contemporaries working to institutionalize sociology in their respective countries, apparently they never read each other’s work). And the chapter by Jeffrey Kopstein poses a riddle. Elsewhere...

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