Radical Protestantism in Spinoza's Thought (review)

One knows that a long-dead philosopher is still being taken seriously by living philosophers when there is controversy among them about the meaning of his or her work for some contemporary philosophical questions. Baruch Spinoza (1632–77), until quite recently, was considered to be a period piece by most philosophers; Harry Wolfson in 1934 deemed Spinoza 'the last of the mediaevals.' However, of late, Spinoza has become the subject of live philosophical discussion, especially within current debates about the meaning of modernity at a time when 'postmodern' thinkers have proclaimed modernity's demise as a normative idea. In response to this ideological obituary, many philosophical defenders of modernity have come to appreciate that Spinoza is a progenitor of the idea of modernity as much as is Descartes or Hobbes – perhaps even more so.

But what sort of modernity is to be defended? One's answer to that question will largely determine how one reads Spinoza and what one wants to take from him. Postmodern thinkers and anti-modern thinkers desiring a return to pre-modern thought, conversely, usually want to overcome Spinoza and his influence past and present. Most modernist defenders of Spinoza and his legacy have concentrated on what he teaches about the role of religion in a largely secular society. What Spinoza called the 'theological-political' question, and what we now call the 'church-state' question, is still at the heart of much public discourse, and it shows no sign of going away, however much some contemporary 'secularists' wish otherwise.

The Canadian philosopher Graeme Hunter has entered the current Spinoza debate by challenging the views of such well-known Spinoza scholars as Jonathan Israel, Yirmiyahu Yovel, and Steven B. Smith, who have argued that Spinoza's treatment of public religion in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is a subtle attempt to get beyond religion in the fully secular society he envisions as an imminent political possibility in seventeenth-century Holland. While accepting the view that Spinoza has totally abandoned Judaism, Hunter is convinced that Spinoza 'was religiously radical, but still very much under the umbrella of Christian thought.' But, if that is the case, why was Spinoza taken to be an atheist and an enemy of Christianity even while alive, let alone after his death? Hunter's answer to that obvious challenge to his thesis is meticulously set forth in this book, employing arguments historical, theological, and philosophical.

Historically, Hunter argues that Spinoza can be taken as a participant in what might be termed the 'radical reformation.' There is good evidence to show that Spinoza, upon leaving Amsterdam (and its orthodox Jewish community), became involved with a group of dissident Protestants known as the 'Collegiants' in the small town of Rijnsburg, where he spent the last years of his rather brief life. This group eschewed almost all rituals and were very concerned with a relationship with God that centred on what they called the 'inner light.' Although Scripture, in both the Old and New Testaments, was authoritative for them, it took second place to the inner light, which they identified with the spirit of Christ. But, even that much 'Christology' did not assert the two most important christological doctrines of orthodox Christianity: the literal and unique incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, and the literal resurrection of Jesus Christ. Moreover, since the Collegiants did not require baptism and its creedal affirmations of those participating in its non-clergy-led, non-sacramental, meetings, Hunter sees Spinoza's connection to the Collegiants as being consistent with his more philosophical understanding of what constitutes true, universal religion.

Theologically, Hunter challenges the widespread opinion that Spinoza was a Deist. By a precise analysis of both the content and the logic of Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Hunter shows that Spinoza affirmed scriptural revelation and its authority, the only proviso being that one must not derive from scriptural revelation texts, teachings, whether practical or theoretical, which are not explicit in Scripture or that clearly contradict what is known by the light of natural reason. Unlike some modern atheistic...