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humanities 557 is no doubt that the collection is a welcome and timely one in these days when we are asked repeatedly to justify what we do and why in the humanities. (SNEJA GUNEW) David. J. Bercuson. Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War University of Toronto Press. xvi, 269. $35.00 Korea would seem an unlikely trigger for a major Canadian Cabinet contretemps, but in December 1947BJanuary 1948 Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St Laurent and Prime Minister W.L.M. King faced off over the issue of Canadian participation in the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). With King absent from Ottawa thanks to a British royal wedding, St Laurent had agreed to send Canadians to that distant Asian land, only to have an angry King overrule the decision. Both men threatened to resign before King, preparing to retire in favour of St Laurent, compromised; Canada would play a strictly controlled role in UNTCOK, even as King fretted that bloodshed in Korea between the West and the Communist bloc was inevitable. King proved all too prescient, for war did come to Korea, and Canadians would fight B and over five hundred would die B in that confusing conflict. Still, most Canadians today, if my students are any measure, possess little awareness of that bitter war or Canada's role therein (or the fact that as a signatory to the 1953 armistice agreement, Canada is obligated to defend South Korea against further aggression). David Bercuson, a historian who has written extensively on Canadian military issues, is intent on bridging that knowledge gap and more. As he notes in his introduction, the more than twenty-five thousand Canadian soldiers who fought in Korea, `improperly armed, under-trained, and illprepared ,' were `ill-served by their government, by their coalition partners, and by much of their own high command.' Has Bercuson succeeded in meeting his goals? The answer is mostly yes. His account of the confusing process that led to the recruitment of the Canadian brigade that served in Korea pointedly reveals just how little attention Ottawa had paid to security needs after the Second World War's end. He makes all too clear that one cannot build a combat force overnight after years of neglect, adding that Canadians showed very little interest in either the war or the men who volunteered to fight it (indeed, Canada's Korean veterans did not receive a service medal until 1999). His accounts of the various battles that involved Canadian troops are clearly drawn, and he is not shy about casting judgments upon those Canadian officers who did not measure up on the battlefield. Most interestingly, Bercuson devotes an entire chapter to a fascinating discussion of the daily routine experienced by Canadian troops in the front line after 1951. 558 letters in canada 1999 Still, I have some criticisms. First, while Bercuson outlines budgetary problems prior to 1950, he does not say anything about military planning for Asia after 1945. As a historian who is interested in the Canadian army's approach to Asia/Pacific security issues until Japan's crushing defeat in 1945, I am curious if anyone in the army had anticipated a Canadian military role of any kind on the Asian mainland. Second, Bercuson has not succeeded in outlining the army's relations with its coalition allies. He discusses the Canadian brigade's two major relationships, first with the Commonwealth division to which the unit was attached for much of the war, and second with higher American command. But there is precious little material cited from American, British, or Australian sources that reveal how those nations' militaries judged their Canadian cobelligerents. Lastly, while Bercuson makes several references to how the catastrophic loss of nearly two thousand Canadian soldiers at Hong Kong in December 1941 served as a cautionary warning that shaped the Korean contribution, he makes no mention of the despatch of five thousand Canadian troops to the Aleutian island of Kiska in August 1943. Not only did those troops serve under American command (the first time that had happened), they wore American uniforms, carried American weapons, used American unit organizations, and relied upon American...

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