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Peirce’s First Critique of the First Critique: A Leibnizian False Start
- Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy
- Indiana University Press
- Volume 49, Number 1, Winter 2013
- pp. 1-26
- 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.49.1.1
- Article
- Additional Information
We argue that until the end of the 1860s, Peirce’s unorthodox reading of Kant was determined by a Leibnizian background. Though a true supporter of transcendental philosophy, Peirce blurred the a priori / a posteriori and analytic / synthetic distinctions and rejected the noumenon in order to realize a synthesis of rationalist dogmatism with Kantian philosophy, because transcendental limitations did not fit his metaphysical project.