Communication and Creative Democracy: Interdisciplinary Perspectives ed. by Omar Swartz (review)

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Keynesian model of government regulation and social entitlement was widely overrun by a resurgence of marketplace economics. Far from fulfilling its promise of unbridled personal freedom and global prosperity, however, the ensuing decade of economic crisis and ongoing disenfranchisement has led many to rethink fundamental beliefs about social justice and the distribution of wealth. Not surprisingly, John Dewey’s call for a “Great Community” figures prominently in this discussion. In 2009, Omar Swartz, Katia Campbell and Christina Pestana explored the promise of Dewey’s democratic community in Neo-Pragmatism, Communication, and the Culture of Creative Democracy. This new collection of essays, Communication and Creative Democracy: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, continues that discussion with contributions from scholars in philosophy, communication, English, and language studies.

Dewey, who famously advocated tackling human problems before philosophical ones, would have been impressed with the scope of these essays. While several authors tread familiar Deweyan themes such as democracy as a way of life, the social dimension of human individuality, and human flourishing as the sole moral end (Swartz, Stroud, Gayman, Durkee), other intriguing contributions extend these themes into new contexts. Full self-realization is denied to those who face physical and rhetorical discrimination due to disability (Torrell), aspire to literacy amid the staccato chatter of the computer age (Ralston), risk social ostracism due to the “courtly” heritage of etiquette (Bratt and Elbousty), or are excluded by voting technology that favors the privileged (Evans).

Each of the authors succeeds in championing Dewey’s vision of democracy as full enfranchisement: that every member of a community is valuable and has a voice worthy of being heard. The collection is somewhat less consistent, however, in articulating Dewey’s corollary of philosophy as criticism: from an open and unlimited input of ideas, discourse and cooperative engagement settle upon a candidate worthy of testing and whose outcome is closely monitored. Authors who specifically acknowledge the critical dimension of Dewey’s thought (Swartz, Gayman, Ralston) are flanked by others who either don’t look far beyond the inclusivity of expression as a sufficient social good, or indulge in a rhetoric of power and oppression characteristic of theorists such as Foucault or Deleuze, but avoided by Dewey.

The latter view is especially understandable, for we have reason to worry that those in power can shape the rules of discourse and decide which ideas are “worthy” of trying out. But about this Dewey was neither blind nor gullible. To avoid an unceasing struggle between “haves” and “have nots” we must recognize that inequalities of protocol and authority are part of the problematic situation, and as such are much as open to discourse and deliberation as any concrete issues. Instead of just trying to reverse the balance of power, the problem invites concerted inquiry into what works best for the mutual benefit of all.

Dewey might agree that this seems naïve or unrealistic in the current climate of power plays and partisan politics. Accordingly, the first line of response requires nothing less than a restructured system of education reflective of truly democratic ways of associated living. But to frame and justify this radical revision we must also revisit our basic presumptions about our place in the world and our relation to others. For Dewey, human problems are fully appreciated only when augmented by theoretical insights, and much of his life’s work exposes the tangible harm traced to self-evidence in rationalism and self-interest in traditional empiricism. Unlike his postmodernist successors, Dewey was not content to simply dismiss ontological problems; instead, he sought to convert them into a logic of experimental inquiry (LW 16: 287). In this approach, self and other are not primordial “givens” locked in a struggle for power, but discriminated loci of agency and action emergent in problematic situations. To regard ourselves as autonomous agents opposed to others in a struggle for power is not just bad social theory, but bad philosophy...