John Dewey's Ethics: Democracy as Experience (review)

In Art as Experience, Dewey famously writes that, "Ultimately there are but two philosophies. One of them accepts life and experience in all its uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and half knowledge and turns that experience upon itself to deepen and intensify its own qualities—to imagination and art. This is the philosophy of Shakespeare and Keats" (LW 10:41).¹ It is also the metaphysics and method of pragmatism, and in John Dewey's Ethics: Democracy as Experience, Gregory Fernando Pappas offers a comprehensive account of Dewey's moral and political thought that is thoroughly rooted in Dewey's pragmatic vision. Pappas advocates an ethic that aims at "a better life relative to where we are, rather than to some predetermined conception of the good life" (286), a life that is intelligent, aesthetic, and democratic (165). He also makes a compelling case for Dewey's view of democracy as "a way of life", a form of experience (hence the subtitle) that seeks to progressively realize communal ideals of freedom, equality, and fraternity that is itself intelligent and aesthetic (221-44). This is an ideal form of democracy that cannot be justified a priori (as some contemporary pragmatists would have it), but can be tested for its ability to ameliorate present problems (219). The book is impressive in scope and accomplishment. Pappas draws on the entire corpus of Dewey's work to reconstruct Dewey's mature moral philosophy and convincingly shows that Dewey's view is not only distinct and defensible philosophically, but vital for dealing with contemporary real- world concerns.

Among the strengths of the book—and there are many—is that while the goal is synthetic, Pappas is analytically inclined, and throughout provides clear explication of key ideas. He offers precise treatment of what Dewey means by such terms as "empirical method" (20-26), "the philosophical fallacy" (Pappas identifies four versions) (26-30), "moral balance" (172-77), the concept of "virtue" and specific virtues (there are at least five) (186-201), and what Dewey means by "faith" when he expresses faith in democracy (293-97). Pappas's illuminating analysis lends pith to his overall reconstruction, allows him to boldly differentiate Dewey from other trends in moral philosophy and identify with precision just how others go wrong and Dewey gets it right. Pappas is at pains throughout to show that Dewey is not a consequentialist (of any kind), deontologist, virtue ethicist, or communitarian, and not only does Pappas amply support his view, he consistently shows why (from a Deweyan perspective) these other approaches are reductive, one- sided, or subject to philosophical fallacy of one sort or another.

Another, and I think the most significant, aspect of Pappas's reconstruction is its emphasis on Dewey's conception of time and present activity. Pappas insists that the point of reflective inquiry for Dewey is not to convert present activity into mere means of attaining imagined futures, but rather to render present activity increasingly intelligent and meaningful, more richly informed by past tendencies and imaginatively constructed futures (147-52). According to Pappas, this reorientation in our understanding of practical activity forecloses any consequentialist or teleological interpretation of Dewey's ethics (a contentious issue among pragmatists; for more on this and other important issues, see J.E. Tiles' excellent review of Pappas in Ethics 119:2, 372-77). It also offers—and I think this is the part that really matters—a radical and (at least some would argue) urgently needed challenge to trends in our contemporary culture.

While Pappas's presentation of Dewey's thought is thoroughly compelling, there are several issues worth raising for further discussion. First, Pappas repeatedly insists that Dewey offers no criteria for moral choice. According to Pappas, Dewey is a radical contextualist who insists that judgment must ultimately be guided by context, by the actual situation in which a moral decision is made (48). Pappas's clear concern is to eschew any interpretation of Dewey that allows recourse to fixed rules...