Abstract

History witnesses alternative approaches to "the proposition." The proposition has been referred to as the object of belief, disbelief, and doubt: generally as the object of propositional attitudes. It has also been taken to be the object of grasping, judging, assuming, affirming, denying, and inquiring: generally as the object of propositional actions. The proposition has also been taken to be the subject of truth and falsity: generally as the subject of propositional properties. It has also been taken as the subject and object of logical propositional relations, e.g. that which can be said to imply, be implied, contradict, be contradicted, etc. It has also been taken to be the resultants or products of propositional operations, usually mental or linguistic; e. g. judging, affirming, and denying have been held to produce propositions called judgments, affirmations, and negations, respectively. Propositions have also been taken to be certain declarative sentences. Finally, the proposition has been taken to be "meanings" of certain declarative sentences. This essay focuses on alternative approaches to "the proposition" considered by the late American philosopher Peter Hare (1935-2008) and of those who influenced him.

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