Human Rights in Deleuze and Bergson’s Later Philosophy

Gilles Deleuze’s later thought revolves around the problem of immanence. Indeed, his final piece, “Immanence: a Life”, restates his definition of philosophy as thought faithful to immanence. But Deleuze’s commitment to immanence also informs his scathing criticism of human rights. His objection is that they introduce a transcendence of the subject that vitiates political thought and practice. In this article, I argue that while Deleuze’s objection pertains to a dominant tradition of human rights, it is possible to conceive of human rights as consistent with a philosophy of immanence. My model is Henri Bergson’s Two Sources of Morality and Religion. In his last great work, Bergson identifies the driving force behind the history of human rights – from its Christian origins down to modern declarations – as an affirmation of the creative force of life and time. Bergson honors the received ends of human rights – such as the flourishing of human faculties and universal love – by framing them as concomitants of the open-soul: those individuals who most resolutely acknowledge the immanence of man and life. Bergson’s theory, I argue, leads to a surprising conclusion: It takes a philosopher (in Deleuze’s sense) to properly see the origin, function, and value of human rights.