Whither Pragmatism?

Introduction

It is safe to say that the 2011 meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy witnessed a first: introduction of the phrase "redneck pragmatism." Gregory Pappas uttered it as a term of contrast. He was seeking to differentiate between a growing body of mind-centered Pragmatism (let us call this "blueblood" pragmatism) emanating from universities that rank high on the Leiter list, and experience-based "redneck" pragmatism, still hanging around in the provinces. As best I could make out, he wanted to figure out a way of sorting through the various pragmatisms now emerging. He sought to set out some traits of what would allow for distinguishing a Pragmatism closer to the center from one more on the periphery.

Let us face facts. Multiple pragmatisms there always will be.¹ Pragmatism's origins were pluralistic, its theory is pluralistic, so there is no reason why its flourishing in the twenty-first century should not be pluralistic as well. Still, one would hope for some family resemblances among the various relatives—resemblances, which when not present, signal fellow philosophers from another family. Pragmatists need not all think alike. A vibrant intellectual family includes both kissing and feuding cousins. Sometimes the feuding is more interesting; at other times, it is the kissing. In order to help sort out which philosophers would be more interesting to feud with and which to kiss, I offer a construal of what a twenty-first-century Pragmatism might look like.

My article is not meant to be a detailed scholarly study of what is the "authentic" Pragmatism. What a stodgy, scholastic endeavor that would be! Rather, my article attempts to articulate an animating blend of elements from Pragmatism's founding figures. These would serve as core characteristics for a vibrant twenty-first-century Pragmatism. The main move is to de-center common epistemology-focused ways in which Pragmatism has often been presented. Stated bluntly, my position wishes to put to rest generalizations like the following: Pragmatism as a method, Pragmatism as a theory of truth, Pragmatism as a theory of inquiry. Such formulations were understandable at the end of the nineteenth century when Cartesian assumptions about the primacy of epistemology continued to hold sway. They are less focal in a world more comfortable with postmodern transformations in philosophy.

My stand, which selects, rearranges, and gives altered emphasis to familiar positions, can be summarized around one label, one slogan, and three themes. The label: anthropological Pragmatism. The slogan: solvitur ambulando. It derives from Diogenes the Cynic, who, faced with a logic-chopping Eleatic deducing the impossibility of motion, simply got up and walked away.² Just so, Pragmatism resists the philosophical temptation to retreat into one's mind. To count as Pragmatist, a position must not only make good reasonable sense. It must also incorporate a solvitur ambulando dimension, paying attention to actions as well as thoughts.

As far as the themes, they are (1) the primacy of praxis, (2) the centrality of good, and (3) the partnership with democracy. Under these headings I would urge certain specific positions as moving to the center for a twenty-first-century Pragmatism. These form the cluster, the sort of multi-pronged center, around which a vibrant Pragmatism can make a contribution to the new century. Pervading the three themes, fittingly, is the Peircian notion of "thirdness," now itself shifted from an epistemological to a more anthropological meaning. This thirdness, in turn, will be accompanied by terminological innovations, some in Latin to go along with the new slogan, (yes, some blueblood snootiness remains), some familiar from the founding figures (good ol' redneck down to earth talk.)

1. The Primacy of Praxis

Where to begin? Well, the word "pragmatism" provides a hint. Charles Peirce claimed to derive it from Kant's use of pragmatisch. The cognate praktish remained too contaminated with notions of inflexibility. Pragmatisch, on the other hand, connoted a "relation to some definite human purpose" (Peirce, CP 5:412, p. 274). The focus on purposes was a reaction to an excessive emphasis on detached, pure rationality in Modern philosophy. Aristotle had identified praxis and poiesis along with theoria as...