Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (review)

The current counterinsurgency strategy pursued in Afghanistan has population protection at its core. It is premised on the assumption that the embattled government is the legitimate ruler that needs support against an ongoing insurgency so as to (re-) assert control across its territory. Once the government can project its power from the center and provide goods and services to the periphery, this counterinsurgency paradigm goes, it will to win its people back from the guerrillas. But in Afghanistan, where the legitimacy of the Karzai government is doubtful at best, the success of this line of thought is highly questionable. This message comes across loud and clear in Thomas Barfield's new and very timely book, entitled Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, which offers an explanation of political legitimacy and power in this embattled country through the years. Few of the pundits on Afghanistan (who have proliferated with the deteriorating conditions in the Afghan theater and the resultant heightened US involvement) can boast Barfield's nuanced knowledge and on-the-ground experience. A leading anthropologist of Afghanistan, Barfield has studied the region for almost four decades, and is intimately aware of how the turmoil of the past informs the situation in presentday Afghanistan.

The book, which makes a largely pathdependent argument (i.e., we can't understand the present without knowing about the past), offers a broader macro-historical, cultural, and political context on Afghanistan as a way to cast light on recent developments. Barfield concedes that geopolitics certainly matter. Afghanistan after all straddles three influential regions (the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia, and Iran); has seen multiple invaders through the years; was caught in the "Great Game" of British India and Russia, the Cold War, and civil war in the 1990s; and has since then sanctioned terrorism and insurgency. But rather than viewing Afghanistan as the backdrop for great power politics, Barfield gives agency back to the Afghans by examining the way local rulers have governed and maintained stability in this country's history. Yes, Afghanistan may be a Muslim, underdeveloped, and failing country. However, this does not mean we have a recipe for how to fix it by drawing upon the experiences of other such countries. Speaking as a true anthropologist, Barfield argues that Afghanistan has its particularities and without first understanding them, we cannot understand how to fix this conflict-ridden country. He guides us through these particularities by looking at the international dimension of the Afghan challenge as a way to address why foreigners have such a hard time ruling Afghanistan. He also looks at the internal conditions, juxtaposing periods of stability and prosperity with those of chaos and collapse.

Barfield's argument for stability is largely anchored in decentralized governance. Historically, successful models of governance in Afghanistan were those where the central authorities were satisfied with directly controlling the urban areas, while having a limited indirect control over the periphery, provided the latter did not pose a challenge to their reign. Indeed, as Barfield artfully illustrates, who-ever tried to rule Afghanistan in a centralized fashion (be it King Amanullah, the Communist Government, or the Taliban) has failed. The fear is that the Karzai government, which came to life after the 2004 constitutional process that aspired to turn Afghanistan into a centralized democracy, is also doomed to fail.

Indeed, the right to rule in Afghanistan, Barfield explains, has traditionally been defined by power and conquest. A legitimate leader was a leader who could provide security and remain unthreatened by his rivals. Barfield writes: "Had Karzai been able to establish security and extend his government's control throughout the country, he would have met the basic premodern test of legitimacy. Holding elections did not compensate for his government's failure to meet this bedrock benchmark" (p. 341).

By presenting the difficulties in imposing a centralized model of control on Afghanistan and suggesting a decentralized design as the optimal strategy, Barfield remains...