Persian Dreams: Moscow and Tehran since the Fall of the Shah (review)

In this volume, US State Department analyst John Parker provides a rich and nuanced account of Moscow’s prickly relationship with Tehran from the downfall of the Shah in 1979 through mid-2008. What he demonstrates in it is that while both governments have shared a common antipathy to American foreign policy, there also have been significant differences between Moscow and Tehran that prevented their relationship from developing into an alliance.

There has been, of course, an important degree of cooperation between Russia and Iran. But while many in the West decry how much Moscow and Tehran cooperate with each other at present, Parker points out that their cooperation was actually greater in the 1990s during the Boris Yeltsin era. It was then that Moscow agreed to help complete the Iranian nuclear reactor at Bushehr (begun by the West Germans before the 1979 Revolution and abandoned by them shortly afterward). In addition, Moscow and Tehran worked together to resolve the civil war in Tajikistan (which lasted from 1992 to 1997), and to prevent the Taliban from overrunning all of Afghanistan before the American-led intervention that began shortly after 9/11.

As Parker points out, Moscow and Tehran have disagreed about several issues, especially since Vladimir Putin came to power. These have included differences over the delimitation of the Caspian (which has blocked important petroleum development projects there); Russian frustration over Tehran not accepting Moscow’s offers to provide Iran with enriched uranium (and thus resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis); Iranian frustration over Moscow’s constantly postponing the completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor; and Tehran’s seeming lack of appreciation for Russian efforts to discourage, delay, and soften Western proposals for UN Security Council Resolutions against Iran over the nuclear issue.

While it is well known in the West that Iranians resent America and Britain for the role they played in the downfall of Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq in 1953, Parker shows that Iranian press commentary reveals the continuing salience of Iranian resentment toward Russia for the early 19^th century treaties that resulted in the Persian Empire ceding territory to the Russian Empire. Indeed, Parker’s account suggests that while there are those in Iran who favor and others who oppose improved relations with the United States, there is not an Iranian constituency that can be characterized as pro-Russian. So long as Iran is at odds with the United States, though, Moscow understands that Tehran finds relations with Russia useful.

But how long will this hold true? A theme in Russian press commentary about Iran to which Parker draws attention is the persistent Russian fear that Iranian-American relations will one day improve, and that when it does, Tehran will be even less cooperative with Moscow than it has been despite Iranian-American relations being poor. If the Obama Administration succeeds in improving Iranian-American relations, the validity of this fear will be tested. On the other hand, if Iranian-American relations do not improve, Parker’s analysis suggests that Russian-Iranian ties are not likely to get any better than they are now.

John Parker’s Persian Dreams is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the extraordinary complexity of the Russian-Iranian relationship.