Morally Corrupt Aesthetic Pleasure?

Why do we not object on moral grounds against the enjoyment of tragedies? And why do we not feel moral guilt when looking forward to watching a tragedy involving a heroine’s suffering? The present paper suggests that concentrating on these questions within the periphery of the paradox of tragedy is as interesting as an inquiry into the question of how the apparently “negative” can arouse feelings of pleasure, which rests on a number of problematic presuppositions concerning hedonic qualities of emotions. Following Walton’s way of looking at the paradox helps us get a clearer idea of what it is that we actually appreciate when in a state of “tragic pleasure.” My paper not only rejects an oversimplified two-object approach but also Susan Feagin’s reflexivist answer, that is, the assumption that tragic pleasure is fed by our moral involvement with the play. I hope to show that tragic pleasure is not independent from conventions; conventions seem to sanction “tragic pleasure” as long as the recipient fulfils two conditions: (i) the specification of the object of his pleasure may not essentially make reference to moral harm, and (ii) he has to believe that his enjoyment has not been at the expense of moral harm.