Political (In)justice: Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina (review)

This insightful book examines political trials in three military regimes: Brazil (1964-1985), Chile (1973-1990), and Argentina (1976-1983). Pereira rightly assumes that there is scarce comparative analysis of political trials under military governments, and that the study of these events is necessary. It is undoubtedly important to understand why military administrations of countries that are comparable in terms of history, geographical proximity, levels of economic development, or cultural traditions had such a different approach to the law. Argentina's military Junta launched a cruel "dirty war" that ended in thousands of "disappeared" people, and tended not to prosecute guerrillas' members in military courts. In Brazil, on the other hand, disappearances were rare and peace-time military courts were used to prosecute political dissidents. In Chile political repression was never as extreme as in Argentina, although the courts seemed more "draconian" in comparison with Brazilian courts.

Facing these facts, Pereira raises many relevant questions: What explains these striking legal variations? Why do authoritarian regimes bother with legal issues at all? Why do some of them reform the law, respect certain legal formalities or promote trials against the opposition, and why do others not? Why, after coming to power by force, do they not continue to rule by force? Why do most of them legalize repression? What can explain that some countries take this goal more seriously and efficiently than others? And also, what is the impact of all these differences regarding the scope and intensity of repression?

Although it is not clear that the author gives a proper answer to all the significant questions that he raises, his work still makes a difference by calling our attention to some significant problems. What is more, he also provides us with initial responses to some of his most important questions. Pereira's main response for explaining the legal variances of political repression lies in history or, to be more specific, in the history of the prior relationship between judicial and military elites. The author considers that legal variations "can be explained primarily by the differing degrees of integration and consensus between judicial and military elites prior to those regimes, as well as the interaction between the legal system, defense lawyers, and civil society groups" (pp. 9-10). He then pays particular attention to the history of relations between military officers and the judiciary, and concludes that the degree of integration and consensus was high in Brazil, low in Argentina, with Chile occupying a middle position. Pereira's main answer is challenging because it defies common interpretations about the subject, which focus more on influences coming from abroad, or internal dynamics within the different military administrations.

Early on, Pereira acknowledges that he is dealing with categories (consensus-integration) that are difficult to measure. It is no surprise that, in the end, he faces difficulties to demonstrate his hypothesis. Pereira uses information gathered from interviews, newspapers, legal decisions, and secondary sources which provide us with certain historical insights as to what happened during the years of terror. However, these testimonies do not provide him with conclusive evidence to support his point, and do not always clearly mean what he suggests they mean. For example, Chile's tradition of having a more rigid separation of power; or the fact that its judges claimed to be apolitical; or the circumstances that the military made different judicial decisions throughout their years in power. Those facts are compatible with both cooperation and lack of cooperation between these complex and sometimes internally fragmented judicial and military elites. Similarly, it is difficult to maintain that the dissolution of the National Penal Court in Argentina, and even the amnesty to political prisoners given in the 1970s, negatively affected the relationship between the judiciary and the military. Maybe the case is just the opposite, namely that as a consequence of those...