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Technology and Culture 47.2 (2006) 349-356



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Searching for Sophocles on Bourbon Street

At the end of April 2006, Dr. Reuss retired from his position as senior historian, water resources, in the Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He plans to remain active in water resources history and looks forward to completing his book on the history of hydrology in the United States. T&C asked for his reaction to the essays concerning Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath that appeared in the January 2006 issue of the journal, and he replied with the essay that follows. The views expressed in it are his, and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

Prologue: The Wyndham New Orleans Hotel, 19 January 2006, 6:30 P.M. Huge glass windows stretch from the eleventh floor reception area to the twelfth floor, where the ballroom is. It is the sixty-fifth annual meeting of the Association of Levee Boards of Louisiana. The association's motto: "Without Flood Protection, Nothing Else Matters." Behind me, the levee board commissioners, their staffs, and spouses—overwhelmingly white, middle-aged, and, it would appear, prosperous—are enjoying dance music and an elaborate buffet. The commissioners are mostly products of Louisiana's deeply embedded political patronage system; their appointments depend on connections more than expertise.1 In front of me, beyond the glass, lie Jackson Square, the desiccated Ninth Ward, and, across the Mississippi, Algiers. Behind me is hope born of undiminished faith in technology. In front of me is passion born of despair. "Surreal" does not begin to describe a scene so out of joint.

* * *

Hurricane Katrina was natural. The disaster that hit New Orleans was not. No amount of rationalization, of posturing, of caviling about this or [End Page 349] that interpretation can change that fact. The ruin of New Orleans resulted from human error and self-delusion, from hope that trumped reality. If one looks back over the years, the disaster unfolds like a Greek tragedy, inevitably, with periodic pain and horror, and with protagonists oblivious to warnings about coming catastrophe. The tragedy of New Orleans (and of many other areas of the Gulf Coast) is not a watershed in American history because of the devastation and suffering, as horrible as they were, but because once and for all it leaves us without so much as a fig leaf to cover human conceit. Now more than ever we recognize the arrogance implicit in the term "natural disaster." Such disasters are rarely inevitable but involve questions of choice. Nature is not responsible. As Pogo Possum said, "We have met the enemy, and he is us."

Almost daily, newspapers publish stories that suggest mistakes and miscalculations in constructing the defenses of New Orleans against floods and storm surges. In the months ahead, various teams of experts will bring forth reports that apportion blame and suggest remedies. In the deluge of ink it is easy to forget that this disaster had many antecedents, and historians have the special responsibility to provide context and perspective. One needn't go far back into the past for material. Hurricane Audrey in 1957 killed 557 victims near St. Charles who had refused to evacuate. Hurricane Betsy in 1965 seriously damaged six thousand homes near the Port of New Orleans; deluged the Lower Ninth Ward with twelve feet of water, carrying away corpses and cars; and blocked the lower Mississippi with a hundred destroyed or grounded barges and dozens of other sunken obstructions.2 Following Hurricane Camille in 1969, one Pass Christian, Mississippi, newspaper publisher called the recovery effort "as colossal a snafu as I've ever seen in my life," and an African-American leader in Biloxi said it was "a dehumanizing and degrading experience." Politicians criticized the relief effort, especially the response of the federal Office of Emergency Preparedness, the forerunner of the Federal Emergency Management Administration. Even the Red Cross received criticism for giving less money to a black than to a white...

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