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  • Die PAL-SECAM-Kontroverse in der DDR: Die politisch-ideologische Instrumentalisierung der Farbfernsehfrage durch den ostdeutschen Staat zwischen 1965 und 1969
  • Ray Stokes (bio)
Die PAL-SECAM-Kontroverse in der DDR: Die politisch-ideologische Instrumentalisierung der Farbfernsehfrage durch den ostdeutschen Staat zwischen 1965 und 1969. By Gerald Glaubitz. Diepholz: GNT-Verlag, 2003. Pp. 128. €20.

Gerald Glaubitz ends the first paragraph of this fascinating little book by quoting Charles de Gaulle's bon mot, "Whoever has hold of television has hold of a country" (p. 7). But having "hold of" television is not entirely straightforward. Does it mean controlling the content of television and/or the means of distributing it through state ownership, licensing, and/or regulation? Or does it mean control at a more fundamental level, control of the technology itself, through standards? De Gaulle's role in the PAL-SECAM debates of the 1960s over norms and technologies for color television indicates that the second question was critical for him, and that his actions were particularly controversial in East Germany (GDR).

The controversy arose out of Europe's response to a particular anomaly in the first color television standards, which were developed during the early 1950s in the United States by the National Television Standards Committee. Initial versions produced a phase error in the signal, and the viewer saw "never twice the same color" (p. 15). By the late 1950s, however, French researchers had come up with a possible solution to the phase-error problem, the so-called sequential couleur avec memoire, or SECAM, system. Within a short time, a West German solution to the anomaly, the phase-alternating line, or PAL, system had been developed as well. SECAM and PAL were both ready for full deployment by the mid-1960s, but each of these systems was more or less incompatible with the others.

Glaubitz tells a story of dispassionate research and development by apolitical engineers and scientists. But he argues that de Gaulle politicized the technology by seizing on SECAM as a way of asserting national pride and political power, most notably in relations with the United States. Specifically, his government signed an agreement for adoption of SECAM with the Soviet regime on 22 March 1965. Meanwhile, in the GDR, technical analyses of the two sets of norms came down in favor of PAL. But the French-Soviet agreement, combined with a realization in the GDR of the political implications of technological choice, precipitated a major disagreement that culminated in the introduction of SECAM in the GDR in October 1969.

The author's reconstruction of this debate is fascinating. Adoption of SECAM would cement relations with the rest of the Soviet bloc, as most other countries would follow the lead of their "big brother." SECAM had the added virtue of speeding full diplomatic recognition of the GDR through negotiations with French authorities. On the other hand, embracing SECAM would mark a break with common German technological traditions, [End Page 832] thereby precluding the possibility of effectively directing propaganda at the West German working class. (SECAM signals would only be visible in black and white and with somewhat diminished quality on PAL televisions.) Then again, SECAM incompatibility with PAL might also help keep West German propaganda out of the GDR, but there were concerns that the West Germans might set up special SECAM broadcasts directed to an East German audience. Decisions, decisions. In the end, though, it is perhaps not surprising that the GDR decided to side with its superpower protector, and SECAM technology remained the norm throughout the last two decades of its existence as a Soviet satellite.

This book provides a nice overview of the main features of the debate based on evidence from German and French archival sources and on interviews. It is not without faults, however. The notion that technological development is apolitical until the politicians get involved is somewhat naive. Likewise, the implication that there was a four-year "controversy" about this issue in the GDR is misleading; the East German Ministerial Council actually agreed to adopt SECAM as early as December 1966. And, as Glaubitz himself indicates, problems involving SECAM/PAL incompatibility were being overcome as early as 1967 by...

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