Cambodia in 2012: Towards Developmental Authoritarianism?

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A number of major events occurred in 2012 signalling Cambodia’s movement deeper into an era of transformation in the spheres of politics, economics, and international affairs. The country’s economy continued to be strong, growing at around 6.6 per cent. Cambodia received international attention as it assumed the rotating chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Cambodia’s politics witnessed deeper consolidation of power by Prime Minister Hun Sen and his party, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). This chapter addresses these changes, juxtaposing views of the regime’s opponents and proponents around four themes: Hun Sen’s power consolidation, decentralization and the reconfiguring of opposition parties, socio-economic development, and foreign relations.

Deeper Consolidation of Power by Hun Sen/CPP

In October, Cambodia mourned the death of its revered former king, Norodom Sihanouk, who had been closely intertwined with modern Cambodian history for over six decades. Cambodians remembered the former king as the champion of Cambodia’s independence from France in 1954 and a stabilizing force and icon of morality in the fragile post-conflict Cambodia of the 1990s and early 2000s. The death of the former king and the declining health and power of CPP’s nominal party president — Chea Sim — has left Prime Minister Hun Sen as the towering figure in contemporary Cambodia.

With sustainable economic growth based on an ideology of developmental authoritarianism, the government implemented key reforms while restricting civil and political liberties. After almost two decades of resistance to domestic and international demands, it began to address the issues of corruption and impunity, which had long been seen as endemic and damaging to the country’s sustainable and inclusive growth. The year saw a number of high-profile arrests and prosecutions of government officials including senior police and military officials, judges, and court clerks. Arguably, these actions have tamed corrupt practices among government officials because they realize that someone else is now watching over their shoulders. This phenomenon will not, however, significantly reduce rent-seeking because power in Cambodia is structured, exercised, and legitimized via patronage. Electoral victory and political legitimacy is based on personal gifts by CPP’s leaders — particularly those of Prime Minister Hun Sen — made possible by the financial contributions of state officials and businessmen/women. As most income of these officials and business tycoons is acquired through rents, the government’s approach to corruption did not end the practice; rather it transformed corruption into a centralized neo-patrimonial form that combines a modern bureaucracy and personalized patron-client relationships within a traditional system of patrimonialism, without clear distinction between the public and private realms.

Although patronage politics often inflicts social costs such as inequality and monopolies, it can in some instances produce aggregate positive benefits such as political stability, improvement of public services and increased inflow of foreign investment. Cambodia has shifted from decentralized patronage conditions wherein elites were vulnerable and, therefore, focused on a short-term scramble for resources, into a centralized, confident neo-patrimonial regime whose elites believe that they have a stake within the society. That confidence is reflected in continuing elite engagement in coordinated long-term investment in banking, real estate, natural resource extraction, and agriculture.

Another trajectory of power consolidation by the CPP and Prime Minister Hun Sen is the appointment of the children of current CPP leaders to responsible ministerial positions, a practice that creates a new class of princelings. Some of these appointees were trained in Western universities and presumably are qualified for the positions they hold. Another prominent feature is the increasingly active political engagement by CPP’s “youth groups” whose members were recruited from various government institutions and universities to engage in rural development under the leadership of the children of the CPP’s current leaders. The youth groups are structured in a similar fashion to the current CPP, consisting of multiple groups under the umbrella of Prime Minister Hun Sen’s sons and other CPP senior leaders’ sons. This younger generation has intensified their contacts with the Cambodian public, particularly...