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  • The Philippines in the South China SeaOut of Time, Out of Options?
  • Maria Ortuoste (bio)

Background

The Philippines began claiming parts of the Spratly Islands — the Kalayaan Island Group or KIG — in the 1950s when Tomas Cloma discovered them unoccupied. Since then, the Philippines has promulgated laws on archipelagic baselines and the geographic scope of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and placed the KIG under the administrative jurisdiction of Palawan province. In 2009, the Philippines submitted the geographical coordinates for its archipelagic baselines to the United Nations. Using the “regime of islands” principle under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the coordinates show Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc) to be within the country’s EEZ. The government routinely protests the actions of other claimants, and its coast guard arrests fishermen and poachers in the KIG and in the EEZ. The Philippines currently occupies eight islands in the KIG.

These actions are not unique to the Philippines. All South China Sea (SCS) claimants have followed a pattern of (re-)naming, claiming, mapping, occupying islets, protesting each other’s statements or actions, and arresting fishermen and other would-be encroachers. The Philippines has held bilateral consultations with China on SCS-related issues since 1995 but progress has been slow and insignificant.

The Philippines, however, differs from other SCS claimants in two ways. It is the only claimant who has a formal alliance with a major power, the United States. Attacks on Philippine or American vessels could potentially lead [End Page 240] to confrontation with China. Second, the Philippines uses multilateral forums to obtain recognition for its claims as well as to call attention to China’s destabilizing actions. Since 2002, the Philippines and ASEAN have been trying to draft a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea in order to prevent the dispute from escalating, as well as to guarantee freedom of navigation.

Several events in 2012, however, have shown the limits of using the alliance and multilateralism. While supportive of the Philippines, the United States has yet to specify the geographic scope of their treaty. The impasse during the ASEAN foreign ministers’ and leaders’ meetings showed the divide among ASEAN members, some of whom were more easily influenced by China.

Developing a Minimum Credible Defence Posture

The Scarborough Shoal stand-off demonstrated the power asymmetry between China and the Philippines. While the Philippines sent one cutter-turned-“warship”, the Chinese deployed thirty-three ships from civilian agencies such as fishery administration and maritime surveillance. This incident galvanized the Philippine Congress into passing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Modernization Act of 2012. Divided into three stages, the fifteen-year plan hopes to develop a minimum credible defence posture by upgrading aircrafts, coast guard vessels, and monitoring capabilities. But will the Philippines be able to sustain this programme?

The Philippines still faces internal security challenges from the communist insurgency, the Muslim secessionist movement, and intermittent terrorist attacks. The government hopes that its framework agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) will lead to lasting peace and free up money and manpower for external defence. Philippine President Benigno Aquino III wants a new autonomous political entity to be established by the end of his term in 2016. Both groups seem to be open to compromise but the process could be scuttled if certain issues (such as power and revenue sharing) are inadequately addressed, if the newly elected Philippine Congress does not adopt the necessary legislation, or if the agreement’s constitutionality is challenged. There are also two possible spoilers to the peace process — the MILF breakaway group known as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters and the former politicians of the first autonomous government formed in 1989. The Aquino administration is confident that these groups do not pose a credible threat, but it would be unwise for the government to not maintain the flexibility to respond to both internal and external security threats. [End Page 241]

Another challenge is limited financial resources. The military budget will depend on the country’s economic health. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank project a 5 per cent economic growth for the Philippines in 2012. Its economy...

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