Indonesian Politics in 2012: Graft, Intolerance, and Hope of Change in the Late Yudhoyono Period

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Much of the commentary on Indonesian politics in recent few years has focused on the struggle between those pressing for continuing reform and those seeking to halt or reverse it. Pro-reform forces include the media, civil society groups, intellectuals and, to some extent, the public; counter reform forces are generally characterized as elite interests, such as the executive, parliament, major parties, senior public servants and powerful corporate groups and business people, who have an interest in reducing public scrutiny and accountability, particularly as it affects their ability to use high office to generate money for political campaigns, personal enrichment and patronage opportunities.

The majority of commentators have argued that the rapid democratization following Soeharto’s downfall in 1998 has now stalled and in some important areas has been sliding backwards.¹ They cite two types of phenomena to support their contention. The first is overtly political and refers to such democratically regressive initiatives as the government’s attempts to eliminate direct election of governors and restrict the election of district heads, parliament’s efforts to reduce the independence and effectiveness of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the legislating of greater powers for the military and intelligence services, and a new bill on mass organizations that limits freedom of association. The second type of development that is described as contrary to democratization is the rise of religious intolerance. This can take the form of harassment and vilification of, as well as physical violence towards, minorities, and also discriminatory actions by the state that restrict freedom of religious expression. Much of this intolerance originates at the community level but is often tacitly condoned or even openly supported by local and national politicians and leads to restrictive laws and regulations on the grounds of maintaining public order and harmony. Pro-reform groups are typically outspoken in their criticism of political rights and transparency issues, but many of these same groups are tepid or silent in their response to sectarian issues.

The events of 2012 provide new material with which to assess the pro- versus contra-reform struggle. In the political field, some developments remained utterly consistent with patterns established over the past decade, particularly relating to prevalence of corruption, internal party ructions, and pragmatism trumping any ideological considerations in decision-making. But one event, the Jakarta gubernatorial elections, in a manner completely unexpected at the beginning of the year, shook the political establishment and its impact is likely to be felt in the 2014 presidential elections and many of the regional head elections in coming years. The Jakarta election demonstrated that a sizeable portion of the electorate is disillusioned with the “politics as usual” approach of major parties and has a renewed appetite for political change. Whereas the pro-reform forces had previously been seen as falling back in the face of increasingly powerful forces of conservatism, 2012 provided the prospect of resurgence as sections of the electorate embraced a new style of leader with different agendas for change. On the other hand, the past year was notable for the deepening of sectarian inclinations, both within general society and local and national politics.

Politics as Usual

Corruption dominated the media coverage of politics in 2012, much as it has every year since Indonesia embarked on its reformasi process in 1998. In particular, it was the continuing fallout from the Muhammad Nazaruddin case, which first came to public attention in early 2011, which provided the most sensational headlines. In April 2012, Nazaruddin, a parliamentarian and former treasurer for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party (PD), was found guilty by a Jakarta court and sentenced to four years ten months’ jail, with a US$20,000 fine, for his role in the corrupt allocation of contracts to build athletes’ dormitories for the 2011 Southeast Asian Games in Pekanbaru. Nazaruddin appealed the severity of the sentence to the Supreme Court, only to have the judges impose a seven-year jail term and US$30,000 fine.² But more dramatic were the...