Indonesia: Yudhoyono's Legacy between Stability and Stagnation

As Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's two-term presidency draws closer to its 2014 finish line, observers and ordinary Indonesians alike have begun to reflect on the political and social legacy he will leave behind. On the one hand, there is little doubt that historians will look at the Yudhoyono period as a phase of extraordinary stability, both in political and economic terms. Yudhoyono has been able to prevent significant challenges to his regime, kept local violence under control, and maintained satisfactory levels of economic growth. Importantly, Yudhoyono's landslide re-election in 2009 is testimony to these successes and the popular support he enjoyed for much of his tenure. But as is often the case in politics, the other side of the stability coin is stagnation, and Yudhoyono's presidency is no exception to this rule. The President's critics have slammed him for uninspiring leadership, deliberate ambiguity vis-à-vis democratic reform and anti-corruption campaigns, and the government's prioritization of gross domestic product growth over economic equality. They believe that Yudhoyono has squandered a huge opportunity to use the stability of the last few years to push for further reforms and institutionalize the gains made in the earlier post-Soeharto period. In short, they view him as an Indonesian reincarnation of Fidel Ramos, the Philippine president between 1992 and 1998. Like Ramos, so the argument goes, Yudhoyono has put no mechanisms in place that could secure the polity for the time after his presidency. When Ramos left office, his stable six-year term made way to Estrada's chaotic impeachment and Arroyo's return to semi-authoritarianism. What Indonesia will look like after Yudhoyono remains uncertain, his critics assert, and they believe that this is partly due to the President's inactivity and complacency.

Developments in 2011 gave ample ammunition to both camps in the debate outlined above. Certainly, the levels of political stability remained high, with no major incidents threatening to dislodge the post-Soeharto polity. At the same time, economic growth reached numbers last achieved under the New Order regime, approaching seven per cent per annum. What's more, the financial rating agency Fitch granted Indonesia investment grade status for the first time since 1997. Finally, poverty and unemployment also continued to decline, at least according to official statistics. But there were also clear signs of stagnation and even partial regression. To begin with, major corruption scandals and continued attempts to weaken the anti-corruption commission suggested that the quality and extent of corruption remains stubbornly high. Similarly, the government and conservative political elites have started a campaign to rescind electoral reforms achieved since Soeharto's fall, most notably direct ballots for local executive leaders. Furthermore, Yudhoyono and his Cabinet have stood idly by as Islamic radicals intensified their attacks on what they view as heretic sects and on Christian churches. In the same vein, the central government has returned to the hard-nosed security approach of the past to deal with the growing radicalization of independence supporters in Papua, displaying a surprising inability to replicate the success of its negotiation-oriented strategy in Aceh in 2005. Internationally, Indonesia has also not managed to make the much-desired breakthrough onto the world stage, despite its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2011. This chapter will review these key events and developments of 2011 and assess what they mean for Yudhoyono's long-term legacy.

Politics: Stability, Stagnation, or Recession?

Observed from a distance, Yudhoyono's Indonesia continued to present itself in 2011 as a beacon of stability in an otherwise unruly and unpredictable Southeast Asia. The government, while weakened through routine infighting, faced no credible threat from the country's small and disorganized opposition. In terms of internal coalition politics, the most noteworthy event was a minor Cabinet reshuffle in October 2011, in which the President made changes to several positions. But most observers agreed that the modifications were unlikely to have a significant effect on the internal power balance or executive effectiveness of the coalition. In fact, Yudhoyono himself had built up unrealistically high expectations by feeding speculation that he...