The Ongoing Extremist Threat in Indonesia

Despite the steady weakening of major jihadi groups, the potential for low-tech, low-casualty terrorist violence in Indonesia remains high, facilitated by corruption and other shortcomings in key state institutions. Every arrest of a terrorist suspect — and there were more than a hundred in 2010 — produces new information showing that extremist networks are more extensive than previously thought and that groups are constantly evolving and mutating, with older organizations like Jemaah Islamiyah losing ground to new alliances.

The fact that the only deaths at terrorist hands in 2010 were ten Indonesian police officers highlights an ideological shift among extremists that has been taking place for the last several years: Indonesian officials are now seen as at least as much the enemy as the United States and its allies. That shift has come about partly in recognition of the lack of public support for attacks on foreign civilians, partly through the influence on Indonesian radicals of the Jordanian writer Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and partly out of determination to avenge the deaths of mujahidin killed in police raids.

It has produced a concomitant shift in Indonesian Government thinking. Particularly after a plot was discovered in mid-2009 against President Yudhoyono by the same team that bombed two luxury hotels in Jakarta, the government began to see terrorism as an issue of state security, not just an extraordinary crime. This in turn helped fast-track the establishment in July 2010 of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) and has led to a push by the Indonesian military for a greater role in counter-terrorism efforts.

The government made little headway during the year in terrorism prevention efforts, but it did acknowlege the need for better prison oversight after some twenty former prisoners were captured or killed in police operations during the year. The recidivists included several common criminals who had been recruited in prison. While plans remain under discussion for constructing a separate facility for terrorists, some steps were taken towards better monitoring of detainees. Several particularly high-profile suspects arrested during the year were isolated from their friends and held in separate police lock-ups while awaiting trial.

The year also saw increased cooperation in some areas between hardline but non-jihadi groups with more overtly jihadi organizations, particularly over the issue of “Christianization” — referring both to efforts to convert Muslims as well as the alleged growth of Christian influence in traditional Muslim strongholds. With few other local drivers for recruitment, the increasing exploitation of “Christianization” is cause for concern, especially as officials both at the national and local levels appear to have no effective response. The manipulation of this issue was particularly apparent in November in the aftermath of the Mount Merapi volcanic eruption in Central Java.

The Aceh Camp and Its Significance

The most dramatic development of the year was the discovery in February of a jihadi training camp deep in the jungles of northern Aceh where militants from some nine identifiable groups were training.¹ Together they formed an alliance that was briefly known as Al-Qaeda for Mecca’s Verandah, another term for Aceh. Participants defined themselves largely in opposition to two groups. One was Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which they accused of having abandoned active jihad for preaching and publishing. The other was the splinter group led by the late Noordin Top, which they believed lacked a long-term strategy and had failed to achieve anything by repeated bombings.

The camp was the brainchild of Dulmatin, one of the original Bali bombers who from 2003 to at least 2007 was living in Mindanao, first with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), then from 2005 onwards with the Abu Sayyaf Group. In early 2009 he brought the idea to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who allegedly helped raised funds for it through the organization he established in 2008, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT). Throughout 2009, Dulmatin and his colleagues from an array of different jihadi organizations surveyed possible locations and recruited participants. The project was temporarily halted after the July 2009 hotel bombings but resumed a few months later. An Acehnese farmer searching...