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  • LaosCelebrations and Development Debates
  • Simon Creak (bio)

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The past year in Laos has been one of grand celebrations and anniversaries. Bookended by the region’s largest sporting event, the Southeast Asian (SEA) Games, at the end of 2009 and the 450th anniversary of Vientiane as capital in November 2010, the year of festivity was interspersed with a catalogue of more routine revolutionary anniversaries. As one observer joked after the Vientiane anniversary, perhaps there is a “Ministry of Celebrations” in the country.1 These celebrations were significant not only in their own right but also for the insights they offer into recent developments in economics, foreign relations, and politics in Laos. Hosted thanks to vast assistance from the region, the SEA Games sparked a national celebration of unparalleled scale and popularity while the 450th anniversary consolidated the royalist turn in post-socialist historiography.2 The commemorations took place against the backdrop of robust economic growth as the Lao economy bounced relatively unscathed through the global financial crisis, allowing the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) to present the patriotic festivities as a celebration of increasing Lao prosperity as well as pride and patriotism. The national celebrations and the economy also highlighted foreign dependencies in Laos, fuelling debates at the core of development policies. Rather than representing a takeover by China and other regional powers, however, the rushes of foreign capital appear to be consolidating power under the authoritarian LPRP regime, though authority continues to be contested within the party. [End Page 107]

National Celebrations

The success of the SEA Games, hosted by Laos for the first time from 9 to 18 December 2009, was far from a fait accompli.3 Pre-games deals to build critical sporting infrastructure raised questions about the impact of foreign investment on Lao sovereignty — the issue of the times.4 Online critics accused Deputy Prime Minister Somsavat Lengsavad, head of the games organizing committee and broker of a deal to grant prime land to the Chinese stadium developers, of treason (khai sat), a charge based on the perception that his Chinese heritage made him favourable to Chinese interests.5 Privately locals denounced the government as a leech on society. Although the Chinese project was later relocated, the controversy tarnished the image of the games and of Chinese investment in Laos.6 Despite vast foreign assistance, moreover, limited facilities meant there were only twenty-five events in Laos, compared to forty-three in Thailand in 2007. Olympic sports such as gymnastics and basketball were cut whilst novelty events such as fin swimming were included.7 All SEA Games feature eccentric events and organizers countered that there were “25 events for the 25th SEA Games”.8 But regional rivals were unimpressed. Malaysia’s Sports Minister dismissed the SEA Games as a “community Games” while the Bernama press agency asked whether the event was “losing its glamour”. Although the games were mostly overlooked outside of the region, the New York Times summarized: “Laos stumbles on path to sporting glory”.9

The surprise was palpable, then, when the SEA Games did indeed deliver sporting glory, sweeping up the country in an unprecedented wave of popular nationalist euphoria. Almost everyone, from senior officials to fans and market traders, repeated that they were proud (phum chai) — proud of hosting the SEA Games and, in particular, proud of the Lao team, which won 33 gold, 25 silver, and 52 bronze medals. Comfortably exceeding what had seemed an ambitious target of 25 gold and smashing Laos’s previous best of five in 2007, the phenomenal tally of gold was made possible by extensive foreign support with coaching and equipment. This mattered little for fans and organizers as the games unleashed popular support characterized by feverish participation and made concrete the abstract knowledge of the nation. The overwhelmingly popular nature of support blurred the common distinction between official and popular nationalism.

It was easy to pick fault with particular aspects of the games. While official transportation ran smoothly, visiting athletes and officials had little chance to explore Vientiane independently and there were few public spaces or events at which to gather outside the...

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