Abstract

In this article, I argue that the idea of “democratic charisma” is not the oxymoron it first appears to be but is, rather, a term that helps us think about the affective aspects of democratic citizenship and more broadly about the role aesthetics might play in democratic theory. After defining what I understand “charisma” to be, I begin with two historical examples of democratic charisma in U.S. cultural history: Ralph Waldo Emerson’s notion of “the great man” in the 1840s–1850s, and the linked notions of black “power,” “beauty,” and “soul” in the 1960s–1970s. I show that despite their obvious differences, these two examples have structural similarities: most important, both have a qualified conception of “freedom” that takes full account of the circumstances that make absolute freedom impossible. Consequently, both locate the aesthetic not in a realm of pure freedom and play but in a space where freedom and necessity, or autonomy and heteronomy, meet.

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