Abstract

Constitutional federalism is usually suggested as an appropriate and effective form of government for a country that is characterized by significant levels of ethnic diversity. Hence, where destructive ethnic mobilization has resulted in state failure, the suggestion has usually been for the country to adopt some form of constitutional federalism as a way to more effectively manage diversity and minimize further violent conflict. While Somalia is, today, a clear example of a failed state, its governance problems, however, do not emanate from its inability to effectively manage its diverse ethnic populations since the country, essentially, is the most ethnically homogenous country in Africa. Instead, the origins of state failure in Somalia can be traced to violent mobilization by clans and sub-clans for control of the apparatus of governance. This paper puts forth several strategies that can be used to reconstruct and reconstitute the Somali State and provide the country with the types of institutions that will enhance peaceful coexistence and promote long-term and sustainable economic growth and development. The first line of business must be to secure the peace-and this will require external intervention-and then to engage all relevant stakeholders in negotiations to construct and adopt an appropriate system of government. Constitutional federalism, however, may not be well-suited for Somalia, especially given the expressed desire of many of the country's factions for autonomy. A more fitting alternative is the functional overlapping competing jurisdictions (FOCJ) governance model, under which regional political units are defined by their physical boundaries but the delivery of public goods and services is provided jointly by various overlapping jurisdictions. Under the FOCJ, an individual can choose to belong to more than one political jurisdiction, for example, establishing his residence in one jurisdiction and purchasing water, electricity and other services from another.

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