Cultural Formations of Post-Communism: Emancipation, Transition, Nation, and War (review)

Based on a thorough reading of the theoretical literature and primary and secondary sources and on interviews with focus groups in East Central Europe, Michael D. Kennedy's monograph provides an excellent assessment of transition culture, the postcommunist culture that celebrates the shift from a planned economy to a market economy and from dictatorship to democracy. The author explores its historical foundations by concentrating on the interactive relationship between popular pressures in Poland and Hungary, two of the USSR's most problematic client states, and the Soviet reforms under Gorbachev. He describes how in the 1970s and 1980s Eastern European intellectuals produced an inclusive vision of civil society, which promoted democracy, pluralism, and the rule of law. The revolutions of 1989 promised political, social, and economic emancipation from the constraints the Soviet Union imposed after 1945. But after communism's collapse, the cultures of the new postrevolutionary states emphasized the creation of the market over the construction of civil society.

In order to justify the drop in Eastern European living standards in the 1990s, the proponents of the new culture of transition highlighted the contradictions between the capitalist future and the socialist past. The future, according to Kennedy, promised closer ties with the advanced industrialized countries of the West and a rise in people's living standards. The transition culture denounced the socialist past as "a form of inferior economic organization dominated by the Russian statist culture." By identifying the failures of socialism and communism with Russian hegemony, transition culture's advocates institutionalized the separation of the countries of Eastern Europe from Russia and encouraged the strengthening of their national identities.

Although transition culture emphasizes global concerns over local ones, it sought to channel nationalism in order to expand its base of support. By championing a "return to Europe" and by opposing the reappearance of Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe, transition culture gained popular support in most postcommunist societies. Although a supporter of globalization, Kennedy sympathizes with the reasonable security concerns of the small nations in Eastern Europe.

In light of the distinct intensities of their national identities, different postcommunist nations experience transition culture in dissimilar ways. Some (such as the Estonians) express enthusiasm about joining the international political economy; others (such as the Ukrainians) express deep misgivings. Citizens of countries with high levels of national awareness are generally highly committed to transition culture.

Just as transition culture and its channeled nationalism emerged as the dominant paradigm in the mid-1990s in East Central Europe, its alternative — belligerent nationalism — overwhelmed southeastern Europe. The breakdown of Yugoslavia and the conflicts among its successor states challenged transition culture's peaceful road to open markets and democracy. Born in the same nationalist discourse as transition culture, aggressive nationalism in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and Serbia prevented indigenous efforts to integrate this region into the world economy and to create the rule of law. Once nationalist leaders enflamed the masses, respect for minority rights came to an end. Minorities began to fear for their lives. This panic unleashed the subsequent intercommunal violence, ethnic cleansing, and war in this region.

By investigating transition culture since the mid-1980s, the author has produced a highly nuanced evaluation of its evolution, public representations, unspoken assumptions, and internal contradictions. But it is surprising that he did not analyze its agents. Who were they?

Inasmuch as the majority of the revolutions of 1989 emerged as "negotiated revolutions" without violent upheaval, many members of the old elites (if not the majority) joined the new postcommunist elites. Beyond self-preservation, what motivated them? How did the new political elites differ from the old ones? Beyond elite participation, what other factors influenced the Eastern European publics to accept transition culture as a historically inevitable phenomenon? How did transition culture tilt the scales against its ideological opponents?

Although marred by repetition and unnecessary sociological jargon, this is an excellent book...