The Founding Myths of the Haitian Nation

The table of contents of J. C. Dorsainvil's Manuel d'histoire d'Haïti,¹ which for a long time has been the bible for Haitian schoolchildren, has a little surprise in store for those who consult it. After chapter eighteen, none of the chapters has a title, which leads us to understand that the same title applies for all the rest. Thus, the thirteen chapters that follow must have the same title as the eighteenth: "Defending Haiti"("Pour défendre Haïti"). These chapters cover the period from 1804 to today. Does this mean that since Haiti proclaimed its independence, it has always been on the defensive?

This makes you wonder: Did the generals who in 1804 led a victorious war know how to defend Haiti? From the early days, these generals did, of course, construct fortifications, of which the Laferriere Citadel is the most impressive. But these forts have never been in service. One could even say that they have not been able to prevent the comings and goings of foreign troops, the chronology of which gives pause for thought:

1803 Departure of French troops (29 November 1803)
1915. Arrival of American troops (28 July 1915)
1934. Departure of American troops (21 August 1934)
1994. Return of American troops (19 September 1994)
1995. Departure of American troops (31 March 1995)
2004. Return of both American and French troops (29 February 2004) (1 June 2004 French and American troops replaced by UN troops, under Brazilian command)

The fortifications erected in 1804 have not, therefore, stopped the return of foreign troops to Haiti. The famous slogan, inscribed in Article 28 of the 1805 constitution—"At the first warning strike of the cannon, the country disappears and the nation stands up!" (Au premier coup de canon d'alarme, le pays disparaît et la nation est debout!)—has never been invoked. It has not even been pronounced by any one of our generals or presidents, in spite of these continued comings and goings of foreign troops.

According to the well-known adage, war is the armed wing of politics. But the backbone of politics is mythology. The Haitian situation demonstrates to us the inefficacy of certain myths, or at least the need to rework them.

Strategy and Mythology

In the introduction to his translation of Mao Tse-tung's Collected Poetry, Guy Brossolet analyzes the complex relationships that poetic discourse weaves between myth and politics in Chinese culture. He wonders if

a people has any history other than that which simultaneously partakes of myth and reality? If the poem places or displaces problems into an unreal context, if it "modifies" history, this does not compromise its educational role. Quite the contrary; in effect, every civilization has its mythical references, and it is often out of these that the master chooses the "facts" that he presents as an example to his followers.²

Brossolet says "the poem," but he could have quite simply said political discourse, even if all political leaders do not become poets, like Mao Tse-tung did, and even though we might wonder if the partisan who listens to his leader does not receive the leader's views as pure poetry. In Haiti, even recently, we have had poet-presidents as leaders. Moreover, the parallel that Brossolet draws between the political "master" and the master in the pedagogical sense is completely applicable to Haiti. Isn't the master essentially he who gives lessons and who illustrates them by his actions? This is true of Haiti, and particularly in recent times.

Politics, which is not necessarily inspired by poetic discourses, can even operate without any kind of discourse at all. But even when politics is only action, without an accompanying discourse, it is nonetheless linked to mythology. The absence of discourse might even have the advantage of helping politicians avoid contradicting themselves too openly by theorizing their behavior. This is what Frédéric Koller brings to light with regard to the political treatment of certain popular traditions in post-Mao China.³ The authorities show an openness...