The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (review)

For those of us teaching courses on U.S. policy in the Middle East, and on the Arab-Israeli conflict, The Much Too Promised Land by Aaron Miller is a very welcome addition to the literature. Miller, who served in a number of U.S. Government positions dealing with the Middle East, including as deputy to U.S. Middle East envoy Dennis Ross, presents an "insider's view" of what works—and what doesn't—in U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Spicing up his narrative, Miller frequently cites the rather earthy language used by both U.S. officials and foreign leaders, as they discuss Middle Eastern personalities, such as the comments of the late King Hussein of Jordan who characterized Yasser Arafat in the following way: "That little shit. He hasn't a clue what he is doing" (p. 55). Similarly, Miller's portrayal of the eating habits of Israeli negotiators is absolutely hilarious (p. 50). Miller gives the reader a real feel for how Middle Eastern diplomacy actually works, including how divisions among U.S. policy-makers hampers U.S. policy in the region.

The book is divided into three sections. The first is an introduction to the dynamics of Middle East peacemaking and the challenges which even a superpower like the United States faces in trying to enforce its will. This section also includes an entire chapter devoted to the impact of U.S. domestic politics and the strengths and weaknesses of the so-called "Israel Lobby." The second part of the book presents case studies of successful U.S. policymakers: Henry Kissinger in negotiating the Sinai I (1974) and Sinai II (1975) agreements between Israel and Egypt, and the Golan Heights Agreement (1974) between Israel and Syria; Jimmy Carter, who worked out a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt (1979); and James Baker, who successfully convened the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 after the First Gulf War. The final section of the book deals with U.S. President Bill Clinton, who failed in his efforts to achieve peace between Israel and both Syria and the Palestinians, and President George W. Bush who, according to Miller, did not try very hard to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.

In the first section of the book, Miller presents a number of lessons for U.S. policy-makers as they deal with the nations of the Middle East. Perhaps the most pithy are as follows:

In negotiations, to be effective, you need to believe that things can change but have extraordinary patience if they don't.

(p. 26)

You need to be tough but empathetic, firm but practical. And above all, you need to be ready to endure the endless maneuvering and machinations of Arabs and Israelis for whom the conflict has sadly become a way of life.

(pp. 26–27)

Smaller nations will do just about anything to survive, and are not inclined to listen or even trust advice offered by a distant power whose political and physical survival is not at stake. The ghosts of the past, made real by history's fears and traumas, speak louder than the untested promise of a brighter future offered up by American diplomats.

(p. 37)

Americans who recognize the galactic gap between a secure and confident America and the insecure world of Israelis and Arabs fare best of all.

(p. 41)

This conviction (of Yitzhak Rabin), that however well intentioned, the Americans were naive and didn't understand the Arabs, was shared by almost every Israeli with whom we worked.

(p. 42)

In his chapter on the Israel Lobby, Miller shows how a combination of common values and common enemies has forged a close U.S.-Israeli alliance. He also cites the influence of pro-Israeli Jews in the Democratic Party, and pro-Israeli Evangelical Christians in the Republican Party to show the broad bipartisan support for Israel in the U.S...