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  • Revisiting the Yom Kippur War
  • Don Peretz
Revisiting the Yom Kippur War, edited by P. R. Kumaraswamy. London: Frank Cass, 2000. 249 pp. $45.00.

This collection of ten articles by Israeli scholars covers the military, political, economic, and social implications of the 1973 war between Israel, Egypt, and Syria. Although the war began disastrously, Israel emerged militarily superior to both Arab countries but at a huge cost in casualties and severe strains on the country’s economy. Egypt still commemorates as a major victory the feat of its armies in crossing the Suez Canal and driving Israeli forces deep into the Sinai peninsula. The fact that Egyptian and Syrian forces were eventually defeated is overlooked by Cairo in the annual celebrations commemorating “the crossing.”

A central theme in discussion of Israel’s role in the war is the failure of its intelligence services, the lack of preparation for coping with Egyptian and Syrian military initiatives, and the self-deception of army and political leaders who were wedded to an outmoded “conception” about the military capabilities of the Arab states. As a result of victory in 1967 the country’s leaders believed Israel was invincible because of its qualitative superiority. Attachment to this “conception” led higher echelons of military intelligence to ignore critical information about changes in Arab strategy and military capabilities.

In discussing military aspects of the war several authors underscore the perilous situation during the first week when Israel “was quite close to a comprehensive defeat” (p. 224). Defense Minister Moshe Dayan warned of total collapse and “fatal conse quences” for Israel.

After Israel suffered casualties and loss of materiel greater than in any of its wars, the tide was turned—to a large extent because of military supplies from the United States. In his article on diplomacy and the war, Simcha Dinitz, then Israel’s ambassador in Washington, presents a first-hand account of the problems encountered in putting together the American aid package that saved Israel from defeat. He describes the problems in organizing a huge airlift of American weapons and ammunition to the front lines.

Avraham Sela discusses the formation of an Arab war coalition led by Egypt’s President Sadat and its decline as a result of differences among the respective coalition partners. Galia Golan covers the role of the Soviet Union in the war, its concerns about the dangers of escalation, and eventual loss of status among the Arab states while the US emerged as the dominant power, largely resulting from its aid to Israel and Israel’s eventual military success.

Several authors discuss the impact of the war on Israel’s political system, the decline of the Mapai/Labor elite, especially with the demise of such notable figures as Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan. Professor Gabriel Sheffer describes how “[t]he old [End Page 135] regime gradually gave way to the emerging neo-corporatist arrangement that was based on and nurtured by a new breed of political, economic and military leaders” (p. 240).

Susan Hattis Rolef’s article on the domestic fallout of the war emphasizes that the nation emerged from the war in a state of shock, still unable to comprehend the loss of advantages from the six “good years” between June 1967 and October 1973. Although Israel finally defeated the Egyptian and Syrian armies, the cost in lives and the impact on the economy resulted in a legacy of bitterness that took years to overcome. The national mood was more like that of defeat than victory. New political protest movements against the establishment by veterans of the 1973 war and groups like the Black Panthers became more active and influential.

Rolef describes increasing political polarization during the years after the war—on one hand the rise of an increasingly outspoken peace movement (Peace Now); on the other, growing political clout of right-wing militants in the Land of Israel Movement and Gush Emunim.

Rolef concludes that the Yom Kippur War was a natural corollary to the euphoria of the June 1967 War. “The Six Day War placed Israel in a certain optimistic day dream; the Yom Kippur War, though it might itself have been avoided, constituted an unavoidable...

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