The Making of Israeli Militarism (review)

128 SHOFAR Fa112000 Vol. 19, No. I these processes to hold (1) even amongst reserve troops (who, because they are only "part-time" soldiers, might have been expected to be somewhat resistant to the conditioning ofthe "military ethos"), and (2) even under the "gray" conditions ofIDF operations mounted against the intifada (Palestinian uprising, 1987-1993), which, because it was more of a constabulary operation than a conventional military engagemt:nt, raised particularly acute moral dilemmas. Unfortunately, the very briefcompass ofBen-Ari'sbook~oupled, itmustbe said, with the author's occasional preference for a prolix style-does not allow him room to explore all of the various implications of this finding. What, if anything, might it contribute to the ongoing debate about the persistence of"militarism" in Israeli society at large? How might it be reconciled with the phenomenon of conscientious objection which, although still very marginal, nevertheless during the 1980s and 1990s became far more pronounced than was previously thought possible? Above all, what can be inferred from Ben-Ari's study about the benefits and costs to Israel oftransferring to a more "professional" force, in which the current preponderance of reservists will give way to a greater reliance on long-service and salaried personnel, whose commitment to the Israeli version of the "military ethos" might be even more pronounced? It is to be hoped that Ben-Ari will continue his research and thus provide answers to such questions. Certainly; the sensitivity which he displays in the present study provides ample evidence of his ability to do so. Stuart A. Cohen BESA Center & Department of Political Studies Bar-Han University The Making of Israeli Militarism, by Uri Ben-Eliezer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. 278 pp. $35.00. The election of former IDF chief of staff Ehud Barak as Prime Minister, and the inclusion ofretired generals on Barak's personal staff, have prompted renewed interest in civil-military relations in Israe't. Indeed, Uri Ben-Eliezer's The Making ofIsraeli Militarism is only the latest contribution to an impressive body of literature on this topic.1 I See, for example, Yehuda Ben-Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Moshe Lissak, ed., Israeli Society and Its Defense Establishment: The Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1984); Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel 1948-67: Nation-Building and Role Expansion (London: Frank Cass, 1969). Book Reviews 129 What distinguishes this book from earlier works is the author's determination to apply to the civil-militaryparadigm the assumptions and methodologies associated with the new, "critical" generation ofIsraelihistoriography and sociology. Specifically, BenEliezer sets out to explain the existence in Israel of a sociological phenomenon that he variously terms "culturalmilitarism," "rriilitaristicpolitics," "nation-in-arms," "positive militarism," "political praetorianism," or "civilianmilitarism," and which he defmes as the institutionalization in Israeli political culture ofthe propensity to solve all national problems through military force. Interestingly, the author does not attribute this phenomenon to a military coup or praetorianism, i.e., the unsolicited intrusion of military commanders into the political affairs of the state. Rather, he attributes it to a complex arrangement established in the pre-state period between the Yishuv's older generation ofEuropean-born political leaders and the younger native-born generation, who were by the late 1930s becoming increasingly impatient with the policies of selfrestraint (havlagah) and "static defense" adopted by the Jewish Agency and the Hagana in reaction to both Arab terror attacks and the anti-Zionist drift of British policy in Palestine. For Ben-Eliezer, the major protagonist in this civilian-military entente was David Ben-Gurion. Although part of the older generation, Ben-Gurion was nonetheless disposed toward the more activist approach demanded by sabras like Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan, and Yitzhak Rabin. Ben-Gurion also saw parochial advantage in establishing close ties with this group, by pre-empting political challenges to himself and his dominant Mapai party from such groups as Revisionist Zionism (and its paramilitary offshoots, the Irgun and LEHI), the socialist-Zionist Mapamparty, and the Ahdut Ha'avodah kibbutz movement that was...