Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence (review)

150 SHOFAR Fall 1994 Vol. 13, No. 1 Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence, by Samuel M. Katz. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992. 389 pp. $21.95. Because of the regularity of war throughout history, the need for information regarding a potential adversary's capabilities and intentions can be traced back to ancient times. Even as the Israelites wandered in the Sinai, the Lord commanded Moses to send two men into Canaan to spy out the land. The results of this venture were illuminating. The reports of the spies were contradictory and led to considerable division about what action the Israelites were to take, illustrating the still vital problem of how to interpret intelligence, a problem that has grown in complexity as the sources of intelligence procurement have multiplied. But accurate and timely intelligence, properly assessed, remains vital for the survival of the State of Israel, surrounded by strong and hostile neighbors. There have been a considerable number of studies of Israeli intelligence , but scholarly study of military intelligence is made difficult by several factors, including the reluctance of all governments to release any documents regarding intelligence matters and even to deny the very existence of some intelligence agencies, personnel, and methods. The explanation for this continued secrecy is rooted not only in the need to protect agents and informants (HUMINT), but also in the desire to protect the sophisticated technological means of procuring intelligence, mainly signals intelligence (SIGlN'I) and electronic intelligence (ELI NT). Structured loosely on the United States model, the Israeli intelligence community consists of three major branches: the Mossad, the foreign espionage agency; Shin Bel, concerned with internal counterintelligence, and lastly A 'man, the intelligence branch, and now a separate corps, of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). While functional, in Israel, as everywhere, this arrangement is complicated by clashing personal and institutional rivalries and ambitions, panly the result of an inevitable overlap in functions. This has resulted in some bitter personal and inter-branch feuds, the duplication of efforts, sometimes leading to misinterpretations, and on occasion even cynical betrayals. According to Katz, the military intelligence branch, A'man, recently formed into a separate corps within the IDF, has been and remains the most important instrument safeguarding the state's security, helping to offset by superior intelligence the superior forces ofIsrael's Arab enemies. Although they arc not part of the official military inteligence establishment, the author includes some activities of the IDF Special Forces, especially the Book Reviews 151 small' elite reconnaisance units (Sayerot) attached to the three major commands and to the General Staff, and their predecessors in the Haganah, a justifiable inclusion since procurement of intelligence data often constituted a major objective of Israeli special operations. This book is a "good read" but hardly a definitive history of Israeli military intelligence. For the reasons cited above, these activities must remain shrouded in secrecy for many years and even decades, and the author has relied heavily on published materials, an obvious but perhaps unavoidable limitation. Nonetheless, Katz does not hesitate to assign blame for some great and small blunders. His assessment of some of the early military intelligence commanders, especially of Isser Beeri, a man of "unbridled zealousness" is quite correct (pp. 47-49). Not all Israeli intelligence officers or activities were beyond reproach. Troubling to the reviewer, however, were several mistakes revealing carelessness or the author's limited understanding of higher 'military organization and orders of battle. To cite one example: in February 1960, violating the agreement limiting military deployment in the Sinai, Nasser moved three infantry brigades as well as "elements of the 4th Armored Division ... more than five-hundred Egyptian T-54/55 main battle tanks" to the frontier with Israel, a move undetected by A'man for several days (p. 149). The failure of Israeli military intelligence, then headed by Chaim Herzog, is not disputed, but no Egyptian armored division, or for that matter any armored division in the world, ever numbered 500 main battle tanks. And given that the publisher specializes in military history, this raises doubts not only about the author, but perhaps even more about the editing of the book. Such misgivings are further confirmed by some careless use...