Napoleon and Russia

Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace has long defined our understanding of Russia’s war against Napoleon during the long campaign of 1812. In his portrayal the military leadership is given few plaudits, and at the end the reader remains uncertain of what happened to Russia and Napoleon after the long winter retreat in November–December 1812. Moreover most analyses by other writers and historians have focused on Napoleon, on the diplomacy of his defeat, or on British efforts, with almost no attention to the overall contribution that Russia made to his defeat in 1812 and later his defeats in 1813 and 1814 and his first departure from Paris in 1814.

Dominic Lieven’s monumental study, Russia Against Napoleon, will profoundly alter the way historians and readers view the Russian effort, not just in 1812 but also through the final exile of Napoleon from France. Lieven, professor of Russian history at the London School of Economics and the writer of other distinguished works on nineteenth-century Russian history, brings a unique perspective to this task. Three of his ancestors, Baltic Germans who were thoroughly Russianized, played significant roles in the Napoleonic wars. Christoph von Lieven was the youngest staff officer attached to Tsar Alexander, and his brother, Johann, was a division commander. Both men are at the center of much of this story. Their mother, Charlotta Lieven, was a friend of the Dowager Empress Marie, mother of Alexander, and the possible model for Anna Scherer in War and Peace. Dominic Lieven enjoys a complete command of the sources, a sure and deft ability to highlight salient turning points, and a personal perspective on how an aristocratic society functions; and he does not hesitate in disagreeing with other writers, not least Tolstoy.

The author calls his work a study in “power politics” that seeks to “get beyond old Russian myths to the realities of the Russian war effort in 1812–1814.” It is an old-fashioned “study of kings and battles.” Based on the Russian military archives and on a superb understanding of Russian society, Lieven has written a study in which leadership, logistics, grand strategy, intelligence operations, and diplomacy meld to shape and define the eventual success of the war effort. With useful maps that make his chronology easy to follow, Lieven writes, like Shelby Foote, of military engagements with a sense of verve, clarity, and purpose; the reader is never left to wonder what happened (indeed you almost wish he had left a bit out) as he revisits the battles not just of 1812 but also of 1813 and 1814.

Four of his conclusions deserve immediate notice before we turn to the crucial issue of victory ensured by the quality of Russian strategic thinking and its execution. First, Lieven denies that the Russian winter was the decisive factor in Napoleon’s ragged retreat from Moscow in November and December. It was not a hard winter or an early winter but a usual one. The weather did not make retreat easier, but it was not crucial. Next, far more pivotal was Napoleon’s decision to stay in Moscow too long in his desperate hope to force a major engagement with Russian forces—just the kind of engagement the Russian leadership sought to avoid after Borodino. Third, throughout the 1812 campaign and later, Russia’s ability to put experienced cavalry with plenty of horses in the field enabled Russian forces to attack Napoleon’s lines with virtual impunity, all the more so since Napoleon had almost no opportunity to secure more horses. Fourth, and in sharp contrast to Tolstoy, Lieven praises the quality of the Russian military leadership, especially the performance of the younger officers, both those who were Russian and the number of foreign officers who joined the ranks. While he praises the aged General Mikhail Kutuzov, as does Tolstoy, he is even more generous to men such as Barclay de Tolly and Karl von Toll along with numerous others.

In 1807 Napoleon decisively defeated Russian...