Mediterranean Imbalances and the Future of International Migrations in Europe

MEDITERRANEAN IMBALANCES AND. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS IN EUROPE By Jean-Claude Chesnais InFranceaswell asinNorthAmericaorothercountriesofWestern Europe, the shareofmigratingEuropeanshasbecomenegligible,whilethenumberof migrating Third World citizens has greatly increased. France faces an Africanization and Islamization as the demographic and economic gaps between the two banks ofthe Mediterranean Sea widen and people move to the North. This shift has a very peculiar meaning for France, which is the leading Mediterranean power and has a particular connection with Africa. FrancewasthefirstWesternpowerwithastrongMuslimdimension (through Algeria, whichwasaFrenchdépartement), andisnowby farthemostAfricaorientedamongthe membercountriesofthe EuropeanCommunity (EC), due to its colonial past in northern and western Africa. After the first oil shock, domestic economic pressures led several members of the European Community to seek a reduction in the number of resident foreign migrant workers. Financial incentives offered to foreign workers in exchange for their return to their home countries did not prove effective. Efforts toreduce theentryofnew foreign workers were also forthe most part unsuccessful, and immigration continued unabated throughout the 1980s. Thus,thelastdecadesawanincreasingAfricanizationandIslamization ofa growing number ofWest European countries. Among the countries separated by the Mediterranean Sea, a widening imbalance is now apparent; this gap can be viewed from several perspectives —demographic, economic, cultural, and even political. The GulfWar was a culminating point in a process ofmounting contradiction between the West and neighboring Muslim peoples. For many urban unemployed youth ofthe South, whorepresenta largeportionofme frustrated masses, the defeat of Iraq was a humiliation which warrants some sort of revenge against the 103 104 SAISREVIEW Christian West. At the same time, the collapse of communism created an immense vacuum and opened a new path for nationalist and religious feelings. These explosions of nationalism and concomitant inter-ethnic tensions have radically changed the population picture in Europe, North Africa, and elsewhere. Ethnicity has become a major feature ofpersonal identity and ethnic migrations are on the rise as a share ofpopulation movements worldwide. These migrations include the emigration of Christians from Lebanon and other countries ofthe Middle East, ofJews from the formerSovietempire to Israel, andofethnicGermanstotheFederalRepublicofGermany. IntheMiddleEast, non-Muslim minorities are vanishing while in the West, Muslim minorities representagrowingshareofthepopulation. Today,Islamcomprisesaboutone billion people, nearly half of whom live near the southern border of the European world from the Atlantic to the Urals. This paper will focus on four points: the scope of the Mediterranean imbalance; thedemographic meaningandthe likely impactofvarious aspects ofthe imbalance; trans-Mediterranean migrations; and possible responses to the Mediterranean imbalances. The Mediterranean Imbalance: the Greatest Imbalance in History At present, there are three main areas of imbalance on the planet. The American zone, bounded by the Rio Grande, separates a wealthy and largely Anglo-SaxonAmericafromrelativelypoorandprolificLatinAmerica. Inthe Pacific zone, a prosperous Japan has for several decades been able to control population growth and thus presents a stark contrast to the vast poor and densely populated lands ofChinaand the Indian subcontinent. The third area is the Mediterranean, which separates Europe—with its stable welfare states and static populations—from Africa, whose fragile political and economic stability is threatened by an extraordinary population explosion. Ofthe three major areas of imbalance, the Mediterranean is by far the greatest. ThefertilitydifferentialbetweenEuropeandthesouthernbankofthe Mediterranean istwiceaslargeasthegapbetweentheUnitedStatesandLatin America, orbetween Japan and the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of the Far East and the rest of Asia. The economic disparities are also much greater. The average American's purchasing power is four times that ofhis Latin American counterpart. The average EC citizen enjoys a purchasing powerbetween sevenandeighttimesgreaterthan thatofthe averageAfrican. THE FUTURE OF MIGRATIONS IN EUROPE 1 05 Further, perceptions of the economic disparity between Europe and lands south ofthe Mediterranean have been sharpened by the revolutions of 1989 and 1991. NowthatthepeoplesofCentralandEasternEuropehaveundergone democratic revolutions, the continued repression ofauthoritarian regimes in thepoorerSouthcanonly servetoaggravatethealready substantialfrustration of the younger generations in those countries. The combination of demographic , economic, and political imbalances is liable toproduce migration on an unprecedented scale. With the accession ofthe formerGerman Democratic Republic, the EC hasapopulationof346million, whichaccountsforseventypercentofthetotal population of Europe, excluding inhabitants of the former Soviet Union. UsingcurrentECterritoryasaconstant,itsshareofworldpopulationhasfallen from ten percent in 1958 to 6.5 percent in 1992 and is projectedto decrease to only five percent by the year2010. Even taken in its biggest proportions, the population of the northern bank of the Mediterranean does not exceed 800 million—approximately 500million inEurope1 and 290millionintheformer Soviet...