Washington's Quarrel with Castro

WASHINGTON/S QUARREL WITH CASTRO Wayne S. Smith luba was first a Spanish colony and then virtually a United States protectorate . In challenging what it saw as U.S. hegemony over not only Cuba but also over the rest of Latin America, it turned to the Soviet Union. That, of course, resulted in increased U.S. hostility. Over the past three decades, however, the vital factors in this triangular relationship have changed dramatically. Cuba no longer aims to overthrow other Latin American governments; rather, it wishes to increase its influence with them and play a greater role in inter-American affairs. It also wishes to enhance its leadership position within the NonAligned Movement (NAM). In neither of those foreign policy endeavors is its relationship with the Soviet Union helpful; quite the contrary, it is an obstacle to their realization. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is increasingly concentrating on problems at home, on making its own system work. It has little interest in extending socialism to the countries of Latin America, and even less in supporting revolutions to that end. Cuba as the model of a socialist tomorrow is therefore of constantly diminishing value to Moscow. While both Cuba and the Soviet Union wish to maintain their relationship with one another (Cuba principally for economic, the Soviet Wayne S. Smith was for twenty-five years an officer in the United States Foreign Service and was chief of mission at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Cuba from 1979 to 1982. Now an adjunct professor of Latin American studies at SAIS, Dr. Smith is director of Cuban studies and is the author of TAe Closest ofEnemies: A Personaland Diplomatic Account ofthe Castro Years (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987). 165 166 SAIS REVIEW Union for tactical political reasons), it is manifestly in the interests of both to reduce it— perhaps significantly. This creates an obvious opportunity for the United States, whose principal objective with respect to Cuba is the reduction of Soviet presence and influence. Incredibly, however, the United States has not seemed to grasp the significance of the new situation, and certainly has not taken advantage ofit. Quite the contrary, by continuing its time-worn threatening attitude, the United States discourages the diminution of Cuban-Soviet ties. So long as an active threat from the United States exists, for example , neither Cuba nor the Soviet Union are likely to take measures to reduce their military relationship. They must assume that a reduction in military cooperation just might invite another attempted invasion. There are some signs, however, that the Bush administration, which most predict will be more pragmatic and less ideological than its predecessor , perceives the opportunities and will take practical steps to take advantage of them. A good way to begin would be by sitting down to negotiate the problems and disagreements between Cuba and the United States on a systematic, issue-by-issue basis. That in itself would quickly ease tensions and perhaps lead to a more normal, mutually-beneficial relationship between the two. The moment is at hand. It remains to be seen whether or not it will be seized. Castro Defies the Eagle, Turns to the Bear Fidel Castro came to power in 1959 determined to give Cuba the full independence the United States had denied to Cuban insurgents in 1895. Perhaps nothing revealed his mind-set so clearly and poignantly as his remarkupon entering Santiago de Cuba in earlyJanuary of 1959: "There is no North American General Shafter here now to deny us our victory parade." Worried U.S. officials wondered if Castro was under Moscow's influence . Intelligence surveys, however, indicated he had no communist affiliations; rather, he was a fiercely determined and charismatic nationalist leader. Castro intended to assure full Cuban sovereignty. But his ambitions went far beyond Cuba. Castro's objectives were all along international in scope. He had not fought his revolution just to implement an agrarian reform in Cuba. Indeed , given his ambition and ego, it is difficult to imagine Castro content to play on the small stage that was Cuba. Herbert Matthews, one of Castro's most sympathetic chroniclers, has noted: "There is also a Messiah complex. Fidel has all along...