Toward a U.S.-Soviet Agreement in the Philippines

TOWARD A U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES Leif Rosenberger .he most important foreign policy issue facing the new U.S. administration will be the architecture and maintenance of a healthy U.S.-Soviet relationship. Soviet threats to vital U.S. security interests in the Third World, perceived or real, undermine the prospects for the steady improvement of this relationship. In the context of a warming trend in superpower relations, recent movement toward resolution of several regional conflicts, and "new thinking" in both the Kremlin and the White House, the alleviation of tensions through joint U.S. -Soviet efforts in the Third World is both feasible and timely. This article's examination of the current Philippine situation and its superpower component will serve as a yardstick by which to measure the possibilities and prospects for general superpower cooperation in the Third World. The Philippines, a country vital to U.S. strategic interests, looms as a potential battleground for superpower conflict. Soviet support of Third World insurgencies is exemplified by its assistance to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People's Army (NPA), one part of the larger Soviet strategy of establishing Marxist client states. This extension of Soviet security assistance to the CPP/NPA is a strategy that the United States has found difficult to counter. In particular, a neo-isolationist Congress has cut U.S. security (military and economic) assistance back so radically that these potentially powerful tools are no longer viable instruments with which to combat the Soviet strategy. Should this isolationism continue, U.S. policymakers will eventually be faced with Leif Rosenberger is a national security affairs analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. He frequently publishes articles on U.S.-Soviet strategy, international communism, and Third World conflict. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily refect those of the U.S. Army. 213 214 SAIS REVIEW the dilemma of appeasement versus overreaction. Cycles of vacillation between the two choices have not been uncommon in U.S. foreign policy, but they are not inevitable. An approach is proposed whereby the revival of U.S.-Soviet diplomacy would help resolve U.S.-Soviet differences in the Philippines and, perhaps, through extension, in other Third World areas. U.S. Interests U.S. interests in the Philippines— and the anti-Americanism exploited by Moscow and the Philippine Communists today—can be traced to the Spanish-American War. As a result of the war, the United States became the new colonial power occupying the country,1 and it cruelly suppressed the Philippine independence movement. Some Filipinos still believe that, despite their limited capabilities at the time, they were on the verge ofdefeating the Spanish and would have achieved independence had not the United States interfered. Although the United States granted the Philippines independence onJuly 4, 1946, the nature of that independence was still unclear in 1988, when Manila and Washington engaged in protracted base negotiations. Furthermore, many Filipinos continue to resent the perceived U.S. dominance in their country's internal affairs. This sentiment ran particularly high during the Marcos era, despite Marcos's pretensions of "standing up to the Americans." Yet these same Filipinos also have sentimental attachments to the United States and harbor fears of U.S. abandonment. Today, President Corazón Aquino inherits this love-hate relationship with the United States. As she pushes her country toward democracy the United States finds it even more difficult to influence policy in Manila. As the power of the Philippine legislature increases Washington must cultivate an assortment of players, rather than just President Aquino. In this new, more democratic Philippine society in which change takes time and results from consensus, latent anti-Americanism tends to be heard over the still largely pro-American "silent majority." The principal U.S. interests in the Philippines are the same under the Aquino government as during Marcos's tenure.2 The four-fold objective includes the strengthening of the free enterprise economy (while fostering social and economic justice), movement toward a permanent restoration of democracy, the development of a more unified and effective 1.See Donald M. Seekins, "Historical Setting," in Frederica M. Bunge...