The New Political Thinking: Pax Sovietica with a Human Face?

THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING: PAX SOVIETICA WITH A HUMAN FACE? Barry E Lowenkron O'ne of the most perplexing concepts to emerge from General Secretary Gorbachev's many statements is "new political thinking." Subsumed under what he calls a "comprehensive system of international security" (CSIS), the new thinking was spelled out by Gorbachev in Pravda (September 17, 1987) and in his book, Perestroika: New Thinkingfor Our Country and the World. ì Gorbachev's CSIS provisions can be grouped into three broad categories: Military proposals include eliminating nuclear weapons, agreeing on military doctrine, endorsing the concept of "military sufficiency ," and liquidating military blocs and removing foreign bases from host countries. His economic proposals are aimed at promoting eradication of hunger and poverty in the Third World, reaching agreement on a debt strategy for developing countries, and making progress in the area of environmental protection ("ecological security"). His international organization proposals involve expanding the role of the United Nations and extending membership in international financial organizations to all interested nations. Gorbachev's CSIS incorporates many ideas that either run counter to Western security requirements or are inappropriate or irrelevant to the West's pressing foreign policy concerns. Eliminating all nuclear weapons suggests an international system eager to move away from strategic deterrence. Endowing the UN with authority to implement many of these ideas presupposes an organization whose effectiveness matches 1 Mikhail Gorbachev. Perestroika: New Thinkingfor Our Country and the World (New York: Harper and Row. 1987) Barry F. Lowenkron is a professorial lecturer in American foreign policy at SAIS and a member of the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff. The views expressed in the article are not necessarily those of the Department of State. 83 84 SAIS REVIEW its rhetoric. Indeed, when grouped together, many of Gorbachev's CSIS ideas are long on rhetoric and short on solutions to the problems he has outlined. Other ideas incorporated under the new political thinking are not counter to Western interests, but neither are they new. For example, the concept of military "sufficiency" is two decades old in the West; additionally , many of the international problems now embraced by Gorbachev have been recognized and discussed in the West for nearly as long. What is new is that a Soviet leader is enunciating these ideas with the enthusiasm of the converted. What is one to make of this new Soviet thinking? Is Soviet foreign policy undergoing significant change, or is the new political thinking merely a more sophisticated mask concealing the old political thinking? Why is the new political thinking so important to Gorbachev? How can the West best test the new thinking? Should the West endorse the new linkage of new political thinking and perestroïka that, one is led to believe, would lead to a less contentious East-West relationship? Should the United States even try to base its policies on the changes taking place within the Soviet state, or should it continue to focus primarily on how the Soviets respond to the U.S. agenda? That Gorbachev is trying to make changes of historic dimensions in the Soviet state is certain. That his agenda be allowed to shape Western policies is less so. The New Political Thinking: Its Importance to Gorbachev The takeoff point for Gorbachev's new political thinking lies in the Kremlin's recognition of the magnitude of Soviet economic problems, coupled with the setbacks to Soviet foreign policy suffered in the early 1980s. The contrast between the respective positions of the United States and the Soviet Union today and a decade ago is startling. In the mid-1970s the debate in the West was not whether but to what degree U.S. power had eroded. The decline was in contrast with what many referred to as the coming of Soviet imperial power. The dawn of this relatively favorable Soviet position (and confidence in accepting the U.S. offer to begin strategic arms talks) was presaged by then foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, who, in addressing the Supreme Soviet inJune 1968, asserted that the might of the Soviet Union had checked imperialism.2 Gromyko went on to claim that no longer could any decision of any importance in the international system...