Preventing Terrorism: An Analysis of National Strategy

PREVENTING TERRORISM: AN ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY Arnold E. DiLaum ? ike Sisyphus, the mythical character in Hades condemned FOR ETERNITY to push a large stone up a hill only to have it roll down on him, U.S. policies and actions to counter terrorism may be doomed to endless repetitions of failure and national humiliation. The fundamental reason for the U.S. failure to cope with terrorist threats overseas is that the United States has adopted strategies totally inadequate and inappropriate to the task. Underlying current U.S. policies are the strategic premises and principles of deterrence, as if it were possible to "deter" terrorists in the same way the Soviet Union is deterred from launching a nuclear strike or invading Western Europe. The United States has been successful in deterring high-intensity conflicts and direct threats to vital national interests, but it has been unsuccessful in deterring or otherwise coping with the low-intensity threat that terrorism presents. Such forms of conflict obviously pose no threat to the nation's continued existence but do challenge national interests and foreign-policy objectives. The bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983, for example, created such political pressure in the United States that the Reagan administration was forced to withdraw U.S. forces from the area. The collapse of the peacekeeping effort was a clear setback for the United States. That U.S. interests in Lebanon were overstated and the deployment of marines was tactically ill-advised are beside the point. The fact remains that the administration did define Lebanon as a vital interest, which it was ultimately forced to abandon due to an act Arnold E. DiLaura, formerly a research assistant at TheJohns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, is a doctoral candidate in security studies at SAIS. He is currently a Ford Foundation Fellow in International Security and Soviet Studies and consults on defense and foreign-policy issues. 27 28 SAIS REVIEW of terrorism. As Secretary of State George Shultz noted, "The cruel fact of the matter is that terrorism works."1 U.S. foreign-policy objectives and interests are challenged and placed in jeopardy many times each year by terrorist acts in all parts of the globe. The motives and objectives of the groups vary widely, but all types of terrorism have the potential to pose at least some threat to U.S. interests. It is important to note that these interests might be at risk even though U.S. nationals are not among the victims of the attack and the U.S. government is not the intended target. Terrorist activities in El Salvador, for example, are designed to challenge the fragile Duarte government, the collapse of which would threaten regional stability and hence menace the U.S. position in Central America. Other manifestations of international terrorism that threaten U.S. interests include acts perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists and so-called state-sponsored terrorism. Both victims and targets have included U.S. nationals and the U.S. government, as well as Arab nationals and moderate Arab governments. The assassination of Anwar Sadat in October 1981, the attempted assassination of Kuwaiti leader Sheikh Sabah in mid-1985, the bombing of the American embassies in Beirut and Kuwait in 1983, as well as various airline hijackings and bombings, are all recent examples. The objectives of these acts have been to embarrass and humiliate the United States, to cause it to lose influence and withdraw from the region, and to topple pro-Western governments and leaders. The policy question that needs to be addressed is twofold: Why have U.S. policies been ineffective in coping with terrorist threats to U.S. interests , and how can the United States respond in a manner consistent with its values and yet responsive to the threat to its interests? In assessing reasons for the past policy failure, it becomes apparent that policies adopted thus far can best be characterized as deterrenceoriented , strategic-defensive, and reactive. A more effective means of coping with terrorism would involve reorienting U.S. policy to stress prevention over deterrence, and the offensive rather than the defensive. The distinction between a deterrent strategy and a preventive one is critical. Deterrence is...