The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies, and: The American House of Saud, and: Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (review)

248 SAIS REVIEW demonstrated, often against great odds, a remarkable capacity for improvising their own organizations and arranging their lives so as to steer round and even passively resist the oppressive regime which rules them. ... It gives some grounds for hope." The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies. By David E. Long. Boulder, CoL: Westview Press, 1985. pp. 161. The American House ofSaud. By Stephen Emerson. New York: Franklin Watts, 1985. pp. 450. Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security. By Nadav Safran. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. pp. 524. Reviewed by Steven Simon, a State Departmentforeign affairs offcer. That the three books under review concern Saudi Arabia is about all they have in common. The United States and SaudiArabia: AmbivalentAllies by David Long is, despite its title, an upbeat assessment of the "special relationship." Steven Emerson's The American House of Saud is an overwritten, underargued exposé of Saudi influence in the United States. In his Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Questfor Security, Nadav Safran systematically covers Saudi foreign and security policy from the third realm (1902-32) to the close of Khaled's reign in 1982. The thesis of Long's book is straightforward: The United States and Saudi Arabia have long enjoyed a good relationship, in which "each country has benefited greatly from the other's friendship." Nevertheless, the two states have allowed economic, commercial, military, and political interests to overlap in times ofcrisis. The "Arab-Israeli problem" is often the cause of this confusion of interests, which breeds disappointment and resentment in both Washington and Riyadh. Long maintains that if the United States and Saudi Arabia could preserve the independence of these factors, relations between the two would assume a more productive and stable character. In practical terms this means that the United States would end its attempts to compel the Saudis to directly and publicly support the peace process by linking the sale of arms to the kingdom's cooperation. At the same time, the Saudis would have to foreswear the use of the oil weapon as a way of forcing the United States to adopt a more "evenhanded" approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author cautions that such mutual pressure ignores constraints on the maneuverability ofboth parties. The results desired are therefore bound to remain out of reach. Long's conclusion may be reasonable, but his argument is flawed. He overestimates the economic, diplomatic, and military benefits to the United States of the relationship, the importance of our ties to Israel in setting the limits to U.S.-Saudi cooperation, the extent to which Riyadh takes U.S. interests into account in developing policy, and the significance of ideology in Saudi decisionmaking. Consider the putative benefits of the "special relationship." The United States has tried over the past fifteen years to enlist Saudi cooperation in three areas: oil supply and pricing, the peace process, and strategic cooperation. Riyadh has consistently resisted these efforts. According to Long, Saudi Arabia's pricing policy has "reflected its interest in maintaining market stability" and has responded rationally to economic determinants. Most analysts agree. Yet the Saudi decision to maintain the price of oil set in Tehran in December 1973 could be viewed as the result of an array of noneconomic, tactical considerations: BOOK REVIEWS 249 Iranian pressure, anticipated difficulties with Iraq at the upcoming Rabat summit, a perception that the market would bear the new price, a diminished fear of the consequences of rapid modernization, and the continued American emphasis on the special relationship despite the embargo. The decision did not, however, take into account the depressing effect such a large price increase would have on the U.S. economy. The Saudis noted the likelihood of a contraction and saw that its consequences, including reduced demand, would in the end damage their own interests. But market realities and long-term U.S. (and Saudi) interests were not, evidently, the decisive factors in the episode. In 1979 the Saudis followed the same calculus in permitting the second major oil price hike, with equally disastrous consequences for the U.S. economy. It is interesting that in his dosing discussion of the economic basis of Saudi pricing policy, Long does...