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CORRESPONDENCE Bruce W. Morrison, editor Egyptocentrism Revisited To the Editor: Farid el-Khazen's letter in the previous issue of the SAIS Review fails to grasp the purpose of my article (SAIS Review 4:2, Summer-Fall 1984) by assuming I was writing a defense of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The intention of my article was to try to cut through the confusion surrounding that war and to try to analyze the Israeli strategic thought process—whether brilliant or defective, right or wrong—that produced in the Israeli defense establishment the perception of the need for war. Ultimately, I intended to place this in the framework of the culturally ingrained strategic perceptions with which Israel always has been obsessed. My point, perhaps inadequately explained , was simple. The Lebanon war is only part of a complex foreign policy; the reasoning behind the invasion of Lebanon was, in part, a product of the views and expectations of Syrian, Egyptian, and PLO behavior—which seem disjointed to Arabs, but part of a complex whole to Israelis. One of the central points was that Israel, obsessed with Egypt since her creation, still remains strongly influenced by her relations with Egypt. Hence my analysis of Israel's perception of Lebanon as a tool for sabotage of the peace process. Rather than disproving my thesis, Mr. el-Khazen uses unproven clichés to express disagreement with Israel. While at the end of his second paragraph he cites "Israeli militaristic psychology," he gives no example or proof. It is very debatable whether Israel is becoming more or less militaristic, and it deserves a more thorough analysis. He also attributes views to me that I did not profess in my article. I did not go into the complexity of Nasser's problems in 1963 because I do not appreciate them, but because they are irrelevant to my argument . Yet Nasser's preoccupation with other more important problems did not preclude his making subtle moves, which, perhaps even unintentionally, became fateful and critical. That Nasser was preoccupied with Yemen does not rule out his acting in Lebanon in a way which deeply impressed the Israelis. Mr. el-Khazen's response is all too typical of responses to articles attempting to interpret Israeli strategic thought. Rather than trying to come to grips with the Israeli mentality, or even attempting to analyze or describe it, he expresses an obsession with condemning Israel wherever and whenever possible. This reveals much of the nature of the Middle East conflict. David Wurmser Ph.D. Candidate SAIS Washington, D.C. 299 300 SAIS REVIEW Mr. Wurmser's letter responds to a letter to the editorfrom Mr. Farid el-Khazen, abo a Ph.D. candidate at SAIS, which appeared in the correspondence section of the last issue of the Review .---ED. Resource Reprieve? To the Editor: Robert Rothstein in "Condemned to Cooperate : U.S. Resource Diplomacy" (SAIS Review 5: 1, Winter-Spring 1985) applies his considerable analytical powers to what is almost a nonissue. In fact, referring to the danger that U.S. access to vital raw materials might be jeopardized, Rothstein notes that there may be "less to this threat than meets the eye." The rest of the article, however, assumes the threat in one manifestation or another is real and substantial. The "real problem," he observes, "is the increasing [U.S.] dependence on developing countries that are unstable or unreliable." Perhaps, but there is room for doubt. First, a significant portion of U.S. raw material imports come from stable, friendly countries such as Canada. Second, other suppliers of raw materials, while unfriendly , are stable and eager to sell to obtain hard currency, such as the Soviet Union. Even in the worst case of conflict, instability, and hostility toward the United States, suppliers are still often anxious to export, as evidenced by the Iran-Iraq war and the Angolan civil war, in which all three governments continued to sell oil on international markets. The areas in which conflict is the hottest are frequently the areas most in need of money. Secure alternative sources can be developed for some minerals upon which the United States presently depends. Cobalt and manganese, for example, can...

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