The Trans-Atlantic Alliance: Strength Through Crisis

THE TRANS-ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: STRENGTH THROUGH CRISIS Oliver Wright he British prime minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, made the following statement recently in a speech to the Conservative party in Scotland: Once we settle Europe's internal problems, Europe can look more to its global responsiblities. We are part of the free world. We must act with the free world. And that means, first and foremost, that we should work with our great ally across the Atlantic, the United States. I believe profoundly that the alliance between Europe and the United States is vital to the defence of the free world. Conservatives will work for a Europe which is a strong partner of the United States and which uses its experience and an increasing part of its resources to reduce the areas of tension and conflict, to improve the prospects for the poorer countries and to defend and spread beliefs and ideals which are shared by the Western democracies. That is our vision for Europe. These words echo the views of every single British prime minister since the North Atlantic alliance was formed thirty-five years ago. They echo, too, the views of nearly every postwar leader in Western Europe, Sir Oliver Wright is ambassador to the United States from Great Britain. Among the many diplomatic posts he has held during his more than thirty years in Her Majesty's service, Sir Oliver was ambassador to Denmark from 1963 to 1966, and ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1975 to 1981. 201 202 SAIS REVIEW for the alliance has been the success story of the century. It has kept the peace, deterred aggression, and attracted new members. It has provided such a profound sense of security that in a recent poll in Britain more than 70 percent of the respondents said they approved of nato. Only motherhood would win more widespread support. Perhaps nato has been too successful. Perhaps we feel too secure and have forgotten the causes of our success and the reasons for our security. From time to time one senses a distinct feeling of angst in the air. And from time to time we have trans-Atlantic rows, most recently over the Siberian gas pipeline. Europe can seem disunited, whether over a European Community matter, like the British budget problem, or over an alliance issue, like the stationing of cruise and Pershing missiles. This leads pessimists or sensation-mongers to forecast the imminent collapse of the European Community (ec) or an approaching Götterdämmerung for the alliance. All this, as Mark Twain said of a report of his death, is greatly exaggerated. I predict that both the ec and nato have long lives ahead of them. We solved the pipeline issue by taking counsel together and agreeing on an alliance policy for trade in defense-related high technology with the Eastern bloc. The British budget problem has been resolved, and the ec is on the march again. The cruise and Pershing missiles are being placed in Britain, West Germany, and Italy in the originally agreed locations and on schedule. The unilateral disarmers in Europe have consequently lost ground, and Soviet policy has suffered a major reverse. The alliance has emerged from its travails greatly strengthened. Having gained strength by overcoming past crises, we are stronger to overcome the next, because what unites us is immeasurably greater than what divides us. Nonetheless, tojudge by the past, we can expect further crises. They seem to be endemic, in the nature of things, for a number of reasons. The sixteen members of the alliance are democracies with minds and interests of their own. These interests must certainly be harmonized but are unlikely always to be identical. In addition, the European members of the alliance—living close to the Russians for centuries, and next to the Red Army for decades—inevitably view the Soviet Union in a different light than do Americans, who are lucky enough to live several thousand miles away with friendly neighbors to the north and south. However, such a close proximity allows for a greater knowledge and perhaps a lesser fear of the Russians which a greater distance cannot permit. Finally, it seems that there...