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BOOK REVIEWS 257 France, Britain, or Germany, must act in conformity to the dictate of "Balance of Power Theory." The historical actions of the 1930s were directed by the universal, deterministic rules of these two models. The only tension for Mr. Posen in the source and resolution of historical action is in the relative weight of influence assigned to each model. Worse than his manipulation of human decision making is his reduction of human behavior to a litany of sterile absolutes. Military institutions "prefer offense," "oppose innovation," and "attempt to go their own way." At the state level, "expansionist powers prefer offensive doctrines" and "states preparing to fight in coalitions must also please their prospective coalition partners." Is the richness and nuance of human debate and choice in three very different national cultures—the drama and the tragedy that is their own—to be so casually debased simply to extract some morsels of received "truth" in order to illuminate our present path? Mr. Posen, like Mr. Snyder, fortunately has a higher calling. His metamorphosis of another world, a part of our past, into a set of ringing maxims is not without moral utility. By reducing national ethos and military-corporate ethos to cybernetic programs of controlled behavior, Mr. Posen is able to hammer the sum of a set of human experiences into a usable tool ofa contemporary political agenda. Again, as with Mr. Snyder, the utility of the word "offensive" is at the core of his intent. "Offensive" is not an adjective, but a noun charged with political emotion, rooted in the world view of a specific political constituency. The "offensive" equals aggressive war. This is bad. An offensive doctrine inevitably leads to war and usually produces death and defeat. Innovation is good, not because the military always opposes it, but because Britain and France did not introduce innovation in 1940 that led to death and defeat. But innovation that leads to offensive doctrine is bad. Civilian control is good, except when political pressures emerge for offensive war. Then, it, too, is bad, and good politicians must be found. All this appears on his last page. Its real meaning is fairly obvious. Mr. Posen, however, does not assume reader recognition. He brings it right out. The United States is developing "offensive" doctrines for nuclear war, which are leading us "in a dangerous direction." Since human society created history, it has ruthlessly looted its past to exculpate the present. There is bounty there for everyone: every faction, lobby, or interest. For the scholar, however, to ignore his own self-serving participation in this ritual is sad. Remembering the "generation" of 1939, driven by the lessons of 1914, and the "generation" of 1914, driven by the lessons of 1870 or 1814, Messrs. Posen and Snyder indeed offer cautionary tales. In the very worst way, they warn. The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition? David Holloway and Jane M. O. Sharp, eds. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. pp. 290. Reviewed by Michael Vlahos, codirector and professor of the security studies at SAIS. It is tempting to make books from conference papers. It is fashionable. Conferences are the central ritual ofmany academic disciplines, and the trend among disciplines has been to focus scholarly activity on short, monographic, highly specific subjects. Peoplejust don't write in the grand manner anymore; they write "studies." It is easy 258 SAIS REVIEW and popular to commission a set of conference papers and lump them into a single publication. The drawbacks to this approach are in thematic cohesion and consistency of analysis. The Cornell study of the Warsaw Pact suffers in no way from these weaknesses. It is carefully plotted, cohesive both in organization and in presentation . Its problems are of a very different sort. The very title suggests what these problems are. "Alliance in Transition?" raises the specter of transformation, of a historical passage. Transition implies movement from one condition to another. The question mark is apt, indicating that, immersed as we are in the present, we are perhaps not yet in a position of retrospective detachment where the title of transition can yet be assigned. The book, however, in the sum of its authors and articles, never confronts...

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