The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (review)

260 SAIS REVIEW But some of the expansive issues that Mandelbaum tries to clarify simply do not lend themselves to compressed exposition. His discussion of the political doctrines that govern the weapons systems of the superpowers is one such treatment that appears to have been pruned to fit the format of the book. The significance of the concepts of escalation dominance and limited nuclear war are not duly critiqued; the author concentrates on the terrible costs of any nuclear exchange—of which the general is probably conscious—rather than the likelihood of "phenomenal" escalation, and so he concludes that the risk of nuclear war will cause the superpowers to act cautiously enough to avoid it at least until the turn of the century. The potency of military doctrines and leader's acceptance or rejection of them have no place in this work, nor is there any mention of significant structural trends such as the progressive integration of intelligence with warning systems and launch strategies. Thus Mandelbaum's message that the nuclear future will, as in the past, follow a middle road between destruction and disarmament, follows from his estimation that the arms race, nuclear proliferation, and the peace movement will not be decisive issues in the "medium-term" future. It is possible that a closer look at the issues he groups under the heading "the arms race" would have qualified this deduction. The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy By Robert Jervis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. Reviewed byJohn Garofano, M.A. candidate, SAIS. Robert Jervis's latest work, which has thus far received remarkably little attention, makes two significant contributions to the current nuclear debate: It lends to the central issues an analytical rigor deficient in previous writings, and it shows the importance of expanding upon the ideas of the most perceptive earlier theorists in order to apply the results to policy-oriented analysis. Proceeding from an elegant essay on the essential changes brought about by the "nuclear revolution," Jervis anatomizes the United States' contervailing nuclear strategy and lays bare the inconsistencies and contradictions oflogic in American declaratory and force deployment policy. Although he disclaims the notion that logical clarity is either a necessary or sufficient condition for deterrence, Jervis argues that "escapes" to the reasoning of "a more comforting prenuclear world in which safety did not depend on the adversary's restraint" have led to a misguided search for what successive defense secretaries have called "implementable options." The result is that the ambiguous doctrine of flexible response and the related concept of escalation dominance are used to make conventional sense out of the costs and risks of deterrence and defense in the nuclear age. Not only in the critique of the above developments, but also inJervis's main argument that it is the mutual awareness and fear of the risk of escalation to all-out war which is central to crises and limited wars involving both superpowers , the student of deterrence theory and crisis behavior can gain valuable insight into the logic of interstate perceptions. Furthermore, the book suggests BOOK REVIEWS 261 the need for future research on the topic of how American defense policy influences both Soviet military doctrine and the Soviet view of the American willingness to accept risk. The relationship between doctrines and beliefs, which hovers over many of the central arguments in nuclear deterrence, must be explored further if the concept of competition in risk-taking is to be refined. The Committed Observer. By Raymond Aron. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, Inc., 1983. pp. 292. Reviewed by William Green, M.A. candidate, SAIS. A series of interviews accorded by Raymond Aron in 1980 to French television appear in this readable and captivating volume. Aron offers an analysis of the political and economic crises sweeping France during the past fifty years as well as a defense of the positions he took on specific issues. His discussions of the diplomatic failures to bridle Hitler's Germany, the economic weaknesses of the Popular Front's program, the Algerian conflict, and Prague Spring are particularly interesting. Following the war, Aron embarked on a double career as an editorialist and professor of sociology. Journalism permitted him to participate in the nation's...